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THE DTSA AT ONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE 
FIRST YEAR OF LITIGATION UNDER THE  
DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
David S. Levine* & Christopher B. Seaman** 
This Article represents the first comprehensive empirical 
study of the new Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), the 
federal law enacted by Congress in 2016 that expanded trade 
secret law beyond its traditional roots as a state law doctrine.  
The DTSA represents the most significant expansion of 
federal involvement in intellectual property law in at least 
thirty years.  In this study, we examine publicly available 
docket information and pleadings to assess how private 
litigants have been utilizing the DTSA’s new federal civil 
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.  Based upon 
an original dataset of nearly 500 newly filed DTSA cases in 
federal court, we analyze whether the law is beginning to meet 
its sponsors’ stated goals of creating a more robust and 
efficient litigation vehicle for trade secret misappropriation 
victims, thereby helping protect valuable American 
intellectual property assets. 
We find that, similar to state trade secrets law, the 
paradigm misappropriation scenario under the DTSA 
involves a former employee who absconds with alleged trade 
secrets to a competitor.  Other results, however, raise 
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questions about the law’s ability to effectively address modern 
cyberespionage threats, particularly from foreign actors, as 
well as the purpose (or lack thereof) of trade secret law more 
broadly.  We conclude by discussing our data’s implications 
for trade secret law and litigation as well as by commenting 
on the DTSA’s potential impact on the broader issues of 
cybersecurity and information flow within our innovation 
ecosystem. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Defend Trade Secret Act of 20161 is one of the most 
significant developments in intellectual property (“IP”) law in recent 
years.2  Long neglected within IP law,3 the enactment of the DTSA 
brings new prominence to trade secrecy by creating for the first time 
a federal civil cause of action for misappropriation, thus placing trade 
secrets on par with patents, copyrights, and trademarks.  This 
development, although widely praised by the business community4 
and passed through Congress by near-unanimous margins,5 was not 
without controversy.  Concerns were raised about the DTSA’s 
potential impact on startups and other innovators, its affect on labor 
mobility, and its inability to meaningfully combat cyberespionage.6  
Most notably, the DTSA passed despite a paucity of rigorous 
empirical evidence regarding the role of trade secret law and 
litigation in promoting innovation.7 
 
 1. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 2. See PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2017, at iv (2017) 
(“[T]he Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 [is] one of the most momentous changes 
in the history of trade secret protection.”); Christopher B. Seaman, Introduction: 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 278, 279 
(2015) (“[T]he DTSA . . . represent[s] the most significant expansion of federal 
law in IP since the Lanham Act of 1946.”); Eric Goldman, The New ‘Defend Trade 
Secrets Act’ Is The Biggest IP Development In Years, FORBES: TECH (Apr. 28, 2016, 
1:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/04/28/the-new-defend 
-trade-secrets-act-is-the-biggest-ip-development-in-years/#24401ea84261 
(“While creating a new federal trade secret claim to complement existing state 
law may sound more procedural than substantive, the DTSA actually has major 
consequences for intellectual property law and for our economy.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Patrick J. Coyne, What You Should Know About the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act, LAW360 (June 27, 2016, 11:10 PM), https://www.law360.com 
/articles/806201/what-you-should-know-about-the-defend-trade-secrets-act (“For 
decades, trade secrets have been the poor stepchild of intellectual property law.”).  
As coauthor David S. Levine has put it, trade secret law is often viewed as the 
fourth of three areas of IP law because of its relatively limited treatment by 
scholars compared to copyright, patent, and trademark law.  See UNCMJschool, 
David S. Levine, Mary Junck Research Colloquium, YOUTUBE (July 11, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJGGg5lwLBs (at approximately 4:45). 
 4. See infra notes 50–58 and accompanying text (describing support for the 
DTSA). 
 5. The roll call vote on the DTSA was 87–0 in the Senate and 410–2 in the 
House of Representatives. 162 CONG. REC. S1635–36 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016); 162 
CONG. REC. H2046–47 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016). 
 6. See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (describing opposition to 
the DTSA).  The authors were among the group of academics that opposed the 
DTSA.  See infra note 59. 
 7. See Michael Risch, Empirical Methods in Trade Secret Research, in 2 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter 
S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658685 (surveying the 
relevant empirical literature and concluding that “the reality is that we know 
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This Article will help fill an empirical void regarding the most 
important development in modern trade secret law by examining the 
early evidence on how the DTSA is being utilized by industry and the 
bar.  Even though the DTSA has been in force for less than two years, 
it is ripe for a preliminary evaluation.  Through a detailed 
examination of the nearly 500 cases filed in the DTSA’s first year,8 
this Article presents a robust dataset from which to identify early 
trends and implications.  In short, this Article will help inform 
courts,9 practitioners,10 policymakers,11 and 
 
very little about trade secrets, despite the best efforts of a handful of scholars 
conducting research in this area”).  See generally David S. Levine & Ted 
Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (reviewing the existing empirical literature regarding 
startups’ use of trade secrecy and noting the limited extent of trade secret 
empirical study). 
 8. The DTSA’s effective date is May 11, 2016.  See Defend Trade Secrets Act 
of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 9. Some early commentary has described challenges that courts will face in 
interpreting and applying various provisions of the DTSA.  See Peter S. Menell, 
Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 1 
NEV. L.J. FORUM 92, 94–95 (2017) (contending that the district court in Unum 
Group v. Loftus, 220 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D. Mass. 2016), misinterpreted the 
whistleblower protection provision of the DTSA); Sharon K. Sandeen & 
Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 887–911 (2017) (describing various issues that 
federal courts likely must address in interpreting and applying the DTSA). 
 10. There has been substantial practitioner commentary about how the 
DTSA may impact IP disputes.  See, e.g., Dave Bohrer, Extending US Trade 
Secret Law to Reach IP Theft in China, FLAT FEE IP BLOG (Apr. 11, 2017), 
http://www.flatfeeipblog.com/2017/04/articles/trade-secrets/extending-us-trade 
-secret-law-to-reach-ip-theft-in-china (“Bringing suit in federal court provides 
several procedural advantages over state court and asserting a claim under the 
DTSA gives the federal court federal question jurisdiction.”); The Defend Trade 
Secrets Act 2016, a Strong Argument to Mediate IP Disputes, BOILEAU CONFLICT 
SOLUTIONS: BCS MEDIATION BLOG (July 27, 2017), http://www.boileaucs.com 
/defend-trade-secrets-act-2016-strong-argument-mediate-ip-disputes 
(“Mediation privacy is the obvious reason to choose this option, but it is only one 
reason amongst many.  There are plenty of other reasons, including reasons that 
lie within the provisions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the recent Defend 
Trade Secrets Act (2016) themselves.”); George L. Kanabe & Diana Fassbender, 
Pillow Talk: A Threat to Trade Secrets?, TRADE SECRETS WATCH (July 20, 2017), 
http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2017/07/20/pillow-talk-a-threat-to 
-trade-secrets (describing a recent DTSA complaint). 
 11. For example, the lack of hacking claims under the DTSA, see infra 
Subpart IV.B.7, suggests that Congress may pursue additional legislation that 
more directly targets the problem of cyberespionage.  See, e.g., Morgan Chalfant, 
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scholars12 about the potential benefits, drawbacks, and limitations of 
the DTSA. 
More generally, this Article addresses a timely issue, as trade 
secret theft and litigation are on the rise.13  The theft of valuable 
 
 12. There was and has been a significant uptick in trade secret law 
scholarship concurrent with and since the DTSA’s passage.  See, e.g., Derek E. 
Bambauer, Secrecy is Dead – Long Live Trade Secrets, 93 DENV. L. REV. 833 
(2016); John Cannan, A (Mostly) Legislative History of the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act of 2016, 109 L. LIBR. J. 363 (2017); Stephen Y. Chow, DTSA: A Federal Tort 
of Unfair Competition in Aerial Reconnaissance, Broken Deals, and Employment, 
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 341 (2016); Richard F. Dole, Jr., Identifying the 
Trade Secrets at Issue in Litigation Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the 
Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 470 (2017); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or 
Rhetoric: Equating Trade Secrecy with National Security, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 419 (2016); Robin J. Effron, Trade Secrets, Extraterritoriality, and 
Jurisdiction, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765 (2016); Michelle Evans, Plausibility 
Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 188 
(2017); Eric Goldman, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Isn’t an “Intellectual 
Property” Law, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH L.J. 541 (2017); Eric Goldman, Ex 
Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 
284 (2015) [hereinafter Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act]; Robert A. Kearney, Why the Burden of Proving Causation Should Shift to 
the Defendant Under the New Federal Trade Secrets Act, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 
(2016); David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230 (2015); David S. Levine, School Boy’s Tricks: 
Reasonable Cybersecurity and the Panic of Law Creation, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
ONLINE 323 (2015); Menell, supra note 9; Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public 
Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2017); Laura G. 
Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge Networks as Innovation 
Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2017); James Pooley, The Myth of the 
Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act Improves the Protection of 
Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045 (2016); Elizabeth A. Rowe, 
RATs, TRAPs, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381 (2016); Elizabeth A. Rowe, 
Unpacking Trade Secret Damages, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 155 (2017); Sharon K. 
Sandeen & Elizabeth A. Rowe, Debating Employee Non-Competes and Trade 
Secrets, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 438 (2017); Sharon K. Sandeen, The 
DTSA: The Litigator’s Full-Employment Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 308 
(2015); Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9; Christopher B. Seaman, The Case 
Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317 (2015); Seaman, supra 
note 2; Conor D. Tucker, Interstate Trade Secrets? A Principled Framework for 
Identifying Federal Trade Secrets, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
1 (2017); Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Precautions, Possession, and Notice, 
68 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (2017); Brennan R. Block, Note, Nebraska Trade Secret 
Protection: The Forum Selection Conundrum Facing Trade Secret Owners After 
the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 559 (2017); Patrick 
J. Manion, Note, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Defend Trade Secrets 
Act of 2016 and Why the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 Still Matters for 
Trade Secret Misappropriation, 43 J. LEGIS. 289 (2017). 
 13. See David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are 
Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1092 (2012) (“Over the 
past three decades, trade secret litigation in federal courts has grown 
exponentially, doubling roughly every decade, while federal litigation has 
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information through cyberespionage has become front-page news,14 
with companies ranging from entertainment15 to defense16 coming 
under attack, encompassing significant threats to U.S. national 
security and democracy.  In response, companies that are developing 
“blockbuster new technologies in fields such as robotics, virtual 
reality and self-driving cars are increasingly hauling each other into 
court to protect their trade secrets in a series of legal fights that signal 
 
decreased overall.  And over the past two decades, trade secret litigation in state 
court has increased at a rate faster than that of state litigation in general.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Eric Lipton et al., Hacking the Democrats: How Russia Honed 
Its Cyberpower and Trained It on an American Election, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2016, at A1 (recounting a “cyberespionage and information-warfare campaign 
devised to disrupt the 2016 presidential election” by “a cyberespionage team 
linked to the Russian government”); Ali Breland, Target to Pay States $18.5M 
Over Hack, HILL (May 23, 2017, 12:59 PM), http://thehill.com/policy 
/cybersecurity/334747-target-agrees-to-185-million-settlement-for-2013-data 
-breach (“The hack compromised millions of customer accounts, including credit 
card and contact information.”); Samuel Gibbs, Dropbox Hack Leads to Leaking 
of 68m User Passwords on the Internet, GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2016, 6:43 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/31/dropbox-hack-passwords 
-68m-data-breach (“The company had around 100m customers at the time, 
meaning the data dump represents over two-thirds of its user accounts.”); Nicky 
Woolf, DDoS Attack That Disrupted Internet Was Largest of its Kind in History, 
Experts Say, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2016, 4:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/technology/2016/oct/26/ddos-attack-dyn-mirai-botnet (“The victim was the 
servers of Dyn, a company that controls much of the internet’s domain name 
system (DNS) infrastructure.  It was hit on 21 October and remained under 
sustained assault for most of the day, bringing down sites including Twitter, the 
Guardian, Netflix, Reddit, CNN and many others in Europe and the US.”). 
 15. See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Is Said to Find North 
Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at A1 (reporting 
that “American officials have concluded that North Korea was ‘centrally involved’ 
in the hacking of Sony Pictures computers”); Daniel Victor, HBO is Hacked; 
Intruder Claims to Have Details from Top Series, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2017, at B4 
(reporting HBO’s confirmation that it “had been the target of a cyberattack” 
involving data and material from several unaired HBO shows). 
 16. See, e.g., Jon Ostrower, Chinese Executive Pleads Guilty to Hacking U.S. 
Defense Contractors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2016, 10:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/chinese-executive-pleads-guilty-to-hacking-u-s-defense-contractors 
-1458774419 (reporting that Chinese aviation executive Su Bin pled guilty in 
federal court for “conspiring to hack and steal sensitive data from Boeing Co. and 
other U.S. defense contractors”); Adam Segal, Why China Hacks the World, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia 
-Pacific/2016/0131/Why-China-hacks-the-world (reporting that between 2009 
and 2011, “hackers stole some 630,000 files from Boeing related to the C-17, the 
third most expensive plane that the Pentagon has ever developed, with research 
and development costs of $3.4 billion”); see also Aaron J. Burstein, Trade Secrecy 
As an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the Foundations of Economic 
Espionage, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 933, 938 (2009) (contending there is a “mismatch 
between the means of trade secrecy—providing private parties with an IP right—
and the ends of protecting national security interests”); Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra 
note 12, at 434–46 (critically analyzing the use of national security rhetoric in 
trade secret policy). 
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the fierce competition in emerging fields.”17  Although it is difficult to 
quantify the economic losses from misappropriation,18 there is no 
doubt cyberespionage is a significant and growing threat.19 
Indeed, because of the breadth of personal and private 
information held by corporations, the damage from trade secret 
misappropriation now extends to private citizens, entwining trade 
secret law with privacy interests.20  For example, in an alleged attack 
on 500 million Yahoo email accounts, hackers allegedly backed by the 
Russian government purportedly “stole the secret cryptographic 
values that Yahoo assigns to each user for generating cookies, the 
files on a person’s computer that contain details of their login 
history.”21  Armed with this information, the attackers then were able 
to steal the “contents of 6,500 Yahoo[] accounts.”22  In light of the 
rapid expansion of knowledge and information as a source of both 
economic value23 and national security (in light of constant efforts to 
 
 17. Alexis Kramer, Trade Secret Cases Surge as Race for New Tech, Top 
Talent Heats Up, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 10, 2017), https://www.bna.com/trade 
-secret-cases-n73014450731 (noting “at least 35 cases” filed under the DTSA by 
companies in “robotics, alternative energies, semiconductors, online games and 
other emerging technologies”). 
 18. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Levine, supra note 12, at 325 (“To be sure, there is a major problem 
in how we approach cybersecurity as a country.”). 
 20. See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Accountability: Trade Secrets in Our 
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2007) (arguing that although 
there are good reasons to promote trade secrecy in private commerce, “trade 
secrecy must give way to traditional notions of transparency and accountability” 
in some circumstances). 
 21. Michael Riley et al., Russian Agents Accused by U.S. of Masterminding 
Yahoo Hack, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2017, 6:26 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/articles/2017-03-15/russian-spy-agents-accused-by-u-s-of-masterminding 
-yahoo-hack. 
 22. Id. 
 23. While hard numbers about the cost of IP theft, including trade secret 
misappropriation, are hard to determine and potentially exaggerated, they are 
commonly claimed to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.  See, e.g., COMM’N 
ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 1 (2013), 
http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_052213.pdf (“The scale of 
international theft of American [IP] is unprecedented—hundreds of billions of 
dollars per year . . . .”); COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., 
UPDATE TO THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 1 (2017), http://www.ipcommission.org 
/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf (“[T]he theft of IP remains a 
grave threat to the United States . . . .  We estimate that the annual cost to the 
U.S. economy . . . [of] counterfeit goods, pirated software, and theft of trade 
secrets . . . could be as high as $600 billion.”  (emphasis omitted)); Ellen 
Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, Report: Cybercrime and Espionage Costs $445 
Billion Annually, WASH. POST (June 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/world/national-security/report-cybercrime-and-espionage-costs-445-billion 
-annually/2014/06/08/8995291c-ecce-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html?utm 
_term=.852a2c59de90 (citing an estimate from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies that “the likely annual cost of cybercrime and economic 
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steal U.S.-defense-related trade secrets),24 combined with the amount 
of private information held by corporate entities about their 
customers, trade secret law has never been more important to 
understand. 
While cyberespionage often results in headline-grabbing stories, 
previous studies have shown that the bulk of trade secret litigation 
involves more mundane misconduct—a rogue employee who departs 
with trade secret information and joins a competitor or launches a 
new company.25  The data collected in this study suggest that 
litigation under the DTSA follows a similar trend.26  It also supports 
the existing understanding that trade secret misappropriation is 
most often committed by a person in some sort of fiduciary or 
confidential relationship with the victim.27  In short, instances of 
hacking and other intrusions, while high profile and often devastating 
to their victims, remain low compared to bread-and-butter departing 
employee claims.28 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part II 
provides an overview of trade secrecy generally, including the state of 
 
espionage to the world economy [is] more than $445 billion,” including about $100 
billion in the United States alone); see also David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical 
Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 292 
(2010) (“There is little data on the exact value of trade secrets because trade 
secrets are, by definition, secret.  Economists nonetheless estimate that trade 
secrets are a large and increasing percentage of IP.”); Zoe Argento, Killing the 
Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights in 
Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172, 197–99 (2014) 
(stating “there is little to no basis” for many estimates regarding “the level of 
cyber-hacking damage” and explaining why “calculating losses from . . . trade 
secret theft is very difficult”). 
 24. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & FBI, GRIZZLY STEPPE – RUSSIAN 
MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY 1 (2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files 
/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf (“These 
cyber operations have included spearphishing campaigns targeting government 
organizations, critical infrastructure entities, think tanks, universities, political 
organizations, and corporations leading to the theft of information.”); see also Jon 
Swartz & Rachel Sandler, Petya Cyberattack Spreads, Hitting U.S. Businesses, 
USA TODAY (Jun. 27, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news 
/2017/06/27/large-cyberattack-hits-europe-disrupts-power-grid-banks 
/103226268 (“A virulent new strain of ransomware named Petya wreaked havoc 
on some of the most-established companies in Europe and North America on 
Tuesday, capitalizing on the same vulnerabilities that froze hundreds of 
thousands of computers.”). 
 25. See Almeling et al., supra note 23, at 294 (“In over 85% of trade secret 
cases, the alleged misappropriator was someone the trade secret owner knew—
either an employee or a business partner.”); David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical 
Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 69 (2011) 
(noting that 93% of trade secret cases in state court involved an employee or a 
business partner). 
 26. See infra Subpart IV.B.5. 
 27. See infra id. 
 28. See infra Part I. 
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the field prior to the DTSA’s passage, the DTSA’s history and key 
provisions, and the current state of empirical research on trade secret 
law and litigation.  Part III explains the study’s objective, 
methodology, and limitations.  Part IV describes and analyzes the 
results from the study, while Part V identifies implications for 
information system, cybersecurity, and trade secret law and policy, as 
well as areas for potential future research. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF TRADE SECRECY 
To provide context for our study’s findings, a brief overview of 
trade secret law and its use by businesses is helpful.29  This Part first 
summarizes the evolution of trade secret law in the United States 
prior to the DTSA.  It then offers an introduction to the DTSA and its 
main provisions.  Finally, it highlights the current state of empirical 
research into trade secrecy. 
A. Trade Secret Law Prior to the DTSA 
Historically, trade secrecy has been governed by state law.30  
Prior to the DTSA, the dominant trade secret doctrine in the United 
States was the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”),31 which has been 
adopted by forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.32  The UTSA defines a trade secret as 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known or readily ascertainable by other who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the 
 
 29. For a more detailed treatment of trade secret law, see generally Mark A. 
Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 311 (2008); Levine, supra note 20; Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade 
Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2007); Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 
12.  See also Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search 
of a Justification 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998) (providing a detailed survey 
of the history of trade secret law and arguing that “there is no such thing as a 
normatively autonomous body of trade secret law”). 
 30. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9, at 832 (“For over 175 years, state 
law governed civil trade secret principles in the United States . . . .”). 
 31. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
 32. Trade Secrets Act: Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2018).  The only states not to adopt the UTSA are New York, 
Massachusetts, and North Carolina, although North Carolina has a statute that 
is similar to the UTSA.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (2017).  A number 
of other states have modified various provisions of the UTSA in adopting it as 
statutory law.  See generally BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-
STATE SURVEY (5th ed. 2015). 
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subject of reasonable efforts, under the circumstances, to 
maintain its secrecy.33 
This definition is very broad.34  As the Iowa Supreme Court has 
explained, “There is virtually no category of information that cannot, 
as long as the information is protected from disclosure to the public, 
constitute a trade secret.”35  
A trade secret is misappropriated when it is acquired through 
improper means, such as theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach of 
a fiduciary duty or a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through 
electronic or other means.36  Misappropriation also occurs when a 
party discloses or uses a trade secret without consent if the party 
“knew or had reason to know” that the trade secret was originally 
acquired by improper means or in violation of a duty of secrecy.37  
Injunctive and monetary remedies are available against a 
misappropriator.38  This basic structure has driven nearly all U.S. 
trade secret law and litigation over the past several decades.39 
Prior to the DTSA, federal involvement in trade secret law was 
largely confined to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”),40 
which was the “first major federal statute to address trade secret 
misappropriation” by “criminaliz[ing] trade secret misappropriation 
and authoriz[ing] broad domestic and international enforcement 
measures against trade secret misappropriation.”41  Similar to 
subsequent justifications for the DTSA, the EEA was enacted in 
response to the seemingly increased risk of misappropriation using 
 
 33. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). 
 34. See MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 3:34 (2017) (“The statutory 
definition of trade secrets is very broad.”). 
 35. US W. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Office of Consumer Advocate, 498 N.W.2d 711, 
714 (Iowa 1993). 
 36. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i).  “Improper means” also may include 
“otherwise lawful conduct which is improper under the circumstances.”  Id. § 1 
cmt.  The UTSA also specifies some “proper means,” including discovery of the 
trade secret through “independent invention,” “reverse engineering,” or by 
“observation of [an] item in public use or on public display.”  Id. 
 37. Id. § 1(2)(ii). 
 38. Id. §§ 2–4. 
 39. See Seaman, supra note 12, at 353 (explaining that “[t]he UTSA 
effectively serves as a de facto national standard” governing trade secrecy). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–
1839 (2012)).  The Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1905–1909 (2012), makes it a 
misdemeanor offense for federal employees to publicly disclose trade secret 
information learned in their official duties, but this statute does not apply to 
private actors and is rarely invoked.  More commonly, some private plaintiffs 
used other federal statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1030 (2012), to assert claims related to the misappropriation of trade 
secrets and other proprietary and confidential information.  See Seaman, supra 
note 12, at 330–38 (summarizing other federal statutes that are potentially 
applicable to trade secret theft). 
 41. Effron, supra note 12, at 765. 
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new technologies like the internet.42  However, in the intervening 
twenty years, EEA prosecutions were sparse,43 while the United 
States faced a growing threat of cyberespionage by foreign actors, 
notably China44 and Russia.45  Moreover, a growing chorus of industry 
lobbyists and related entities complained that U.S. trade secret law 
was not up to the cyberespionage challenge,46 while others criticized 
the use of “criminal law to enforce trade secret policy.”47 
B. The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 
With trade secret theft and litigation on the rise,48 the DTSA was 
first introduced in Congress on April 29, 2014.49  Senators Chris 
 
 42. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9, at 841–42 (“[I]n the wake of claims 
of widespread espionage by foreign actors against domestic industry (a theme 
revisited with the DTSA), Congress provided for criminal penalties for two forms 
of trade secret theft: (1) espionage on behalf of a foreign entity and (2) theft of 
trade secrets for pecuniary gain.”). 
 43. See Effron, supra note 12, at 768 (“[I]n practice, the United States has 
prosecuted very few cases under the EEA.”). 
 44. Recent reports suggest that Chinese cyberespionage has dropped, but the 
DTSA became law as this was transpiring.  See Joseph Menn & Jim Finkle, 
Chinese Economic Cyber-Espionage Plummets in U.S.: Experts, REUTERS (June 
20, 2016, 8:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-spying-china 
-idUSKCN0Z700D (“FireEye Inc., the U.S. network security company best known 
for fighting sophisticated Chinese hacking, said in a report released late Monday 
that breaches attributed to China-based groups had plunged by 90 percent in the 
past two years.”).  Still, China remains a leading source of cyberespionage.  See 
id. (“FireEye and CrowdStrike said they were confident that [the referenced 
cyberespionage] attacks are being carried out either directly by the Chinese 
government or on its behalf by hired contractors.”).  Additionally, the current U.S. 
administration’s dealings with China could lead to an uptick in Chinese 
cyberespionage.  See Brian Bennett, Trump’s Erratic Style Could Undermine 
China’s Agreement to Stop Hacking U.S. Businesses, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017, 
4:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-fg-us-china-cyber-20170403-story 
.html (“President Trump’s erratic style and free-form diplomacy have U.S. 
cybersecurity experts concerned that he might undermine an Obama-era deal 
with Beijing that sharply curbed widespread Chinese cyberthefts for economic 
gain and unleash a new flood of hacks against U.S. companies.”). 
 45. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & FBI, supra note 24 (“In foreign countries, 
[Russian civilian and military intelligence services (“RIS”)] actors conducted 
damaging and/or disruptive cyber-attacks, including attacks on critical 
infrastructure networks.  In some cases, RIS actors masqueraded as third 
parties, hiding behind false online personas designed to cause the victim to 
misattribute the source of the attack.”). 
 46. See infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 47. Effron, supra note 12, at 765. 
 48. See Almeling et al., supra note 23, at 293 (“Trade secret litigation is 
growing exponentially.”). 
 49. S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014); see also 160 CONG. REC. S2470 (daily ed. Apr. 
29, 2014) (introducing S. 2267, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014).  Senator 
Coons, as well as other members of Congress, previously introduced proposals to 
create a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation, but none 
of those bills received a floor vote in either chamber prior to 2016.  See Seaman, 
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Coons (D-DE) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) celebrated the DTSA’s 
introduction with a flourish, stating that 
in today’s electronic age, trade secrets can be stolen with a few 
keystrokes, and increasingly, they are stolen at the direction of 
a foreign government or for the benefit of a foreign competitor. 
These losses put U.S. jobs at risk and threaten incentives for 
continued investment in research and development. Current 
federal criminal law is insufficient.50 
The DTSA was backed by “a number of high-technology and 
manufacturing firms, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Section of Intellectual Property Law of the American Bar 
Association,”51 as well as by scholars affiliated with George Mason 
University’s Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property.52  
From its inception, the DTSA allowed trade secret owners to bring a 
civil action in federal court for trade secret misappropriation.53 
Despite robust trade secret law under the UTSA, bipartisan 
DTSA supporters initially asserted that existing law was insufficient 
to address the problem of state-sponsored and private corporate 
 
supra note 12, at 340–48 (describing proposed federal civil trade secrets 
legislation prior to the DTSA); see also Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9, at 843–
57 (summarizing the legislative history of the DTSA, including prior bills). 
 50. Press Release, Senators Orrin Hatch & Chris Coons, Hatch, Coons 
Introduce Bill to Combat Theft of Trade Secrets, Protect Jobs (Apr. 29, 2014), 
https://votesmart.org/public-statement/867567/hatch-coons-introduce-bill-to 
-combat-theft-of-trade-secrets-protect-jobs#.WXt_9dKGPIU (“American 
companies are losing jobs because of the theft of trade secrets every day.  This 
bipartisan bill will empower American companies to protect their jobs by legally 
confronting those who steal their trade secrets.”). 
 51. Seaman, supra note 2, at 281–82 (footnotes omitted); see also Isaac 
Arnsdorf, How a Bill (with Virtually No Opposition Still Takes Two Years Before 
It Almost) Becomes a Law (in 2016), POLITICO (May 9, 2016, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/politico-influence/2016/05/how-a-bill-with 
-virtually-no-opposition-still-takes-two-years-before-it-almost-becomes-a-law-in 
-2016-214194 (“The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (S. 1890) is the result of a 
two-year effort by a broad business coalition from Bayer and 3M to GE and 
Google.”); Mark Schultz, Debunking Myths About the Proposed Federal Trade 
Secrets Act, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://cpip.gmu.edu/2015/11/17/debunking-myths-about-the-proposed-federal 
-trade-secrets-act (“Vital proprietary information that once would have resided 
in file cabinets and that would have taken days to copy now can be downloaded 
at the speed of light.”). 
 52. See Schultz, supra note 51 (“The DTSA is needed to improve the speed 
and efficiency of trade secret protection in the U.S.”).  See generally Pooley, supra 
note 12 (advocating for the DTSA’s enactment).  Mr. Pooley’s article was 
apparently sponsored and promoted by the Center for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (“CPIP”).  See Schultz, supra note 51 (“CPIP is proud to 
release a paper authored by . . . James Pooley.  Mr. Pooley’s paper explains the 
arguments in favor of the Defend Trade Secrets Act . . . .”). 
 53. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
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cyberespionage.54  Closer to its passage, however, the sponsors 
changed course and argued that the primary need for the DTSA 
stemmed from alleged litigation inefficiencies and challenges facing 
plaintiffs under state law.55  In addition, the sponsors contended (with 
the backing of entities like 3M, DuPont, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Section of Intellectual Property Law of the 
American Bar Association)56 that the DTSA was justified to combat 
“the rise of trade secret theft by rogue employees” and to allow 
“uniformity” in trade secret law.57  For example, Senator Coons 
explained that “[w]e need this bill now more than ever as more and 
 
 54. See Press Release, Senators Orrin Hatch & Chris Coons, supra note 50.  
The argument that new laws are needed because of the internet has been 
advanced numerous times since the mid-1990s.  See Mark A. Lemley, David S. 
Levine & David G. Post, Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 37 
(2011) (“Laws protecting Internet intermediaries from liability for content on the 
Internet are responsible for transforming the Internet into the revolutionary 
communications medium that it is today.  They reflect a policy that has not only 
helped make the United States the world leader in a wide range of Internet-
related industries, but that has also enabled the Internet’s uniquely 
decentralized structure to serve as a global platform for innovation, speech, 
collaboration, civic engagement, and economic growth.”); Levine, supra note 12, 
at 324–25 (“Suggesting the breadth of the issue and the scope of legislative 
proposals, more than twenty bills [were] introduced in the 114th Congress 
purporting to address ‘data-breach notification, incidents involving other nation-
states, information sharing, law enforcement and cybercrime, protection of 
critical infrastructure . . . , workforce development, and education.’” (quoting 
RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43317, CYBERSECURITY: LEGISLATION, 
HEARINGS, AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS 2 (2015), https://www.fas.org 
/sgp/crs/misc/R43317.pdf)); David S. Levine, Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the 
“Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act” (S. 754), CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 
STAN. L. SCH. (Oct. 26, 2015, 8:41 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015 
/10/professors-letter-opposition-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-s-754 
(“Rather than encouraging companies to increase their own cybersecurity 
standards, [the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act] ignores that goal and 
offloads responsibility to a generalized public-private secret information sharing 
network.”); see also Risch, supra note 29, at 5 (“[T]rade secret law is not merely a 
result of irrational and inefficient decision making.  Instead, trade secrets are 
justified by the economic benefits that flow from their existence, most notably for 
businesses to spend less money protecting secret information or attempting to 
appropriate secret information.”); Press Release, Senators Orrin Hatch & Chris 
Coons, supra note 50. 
 55. See David S. Levine, The Anti-Cyberespionage Bill That Isn’t, Or Never 
Was?, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, STAN. L. SCH. (Jan. 23, 2016, 1:14 PM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/01/anti-cyberespionage-bill-isnt-or-never 
-was. 
 56. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9, at 854–55 (describing the 
extensive lobbying efforts in support of the DTSA). 
 57. See Levine, supra note 55 (“[I]f the new primary foci are the ‘rogue 
employee’ and a purported need for uniformity, then the DTSA’s imbalance on 
the cost-benefit scale is even greater.”). 
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more American companies are losing jobs and revenue because they 
lack the ability to defend their trade secrets under federal civil law.”58 
The only organized opposition to the DTSA came from a group of 
law professors.59  In a series of letters and articles, these academics 
(including both authors) raised several concerns, including that the 
DTSA would (1) not meaningfully address cyberespionage; (2) likely 
result in less uniformity in trade secret law; (3) negatively impact 
information flows; and (4) potentially impose other costs on 
innovators, particularly startups and small businesses, through its ex 
parte seizure remedy and impact on labor mobility.60  Similarly, in a 
2015 letter to Congress, these academics identified the following 
potential drawbacks of the bill: 
(1) the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision may harm small 
businesses, startups and other innovators, (2) the DTSA 
appears to implicitly recognize the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, (3) the DTSA likely will increase the length and cost of 
trade secret litigation, and (4) the DTSA will likely result in less 
uniformity in trade secret law.61 
With particular regard to the question of the DTSA’s impact on 
cyberespionage, David S. Levine and Sharon Sandeen argued that the 
“dearth of data, combined with a widely held but unsubstantiated 
belief that a federal private cause of action would help, will not help 
to address, much less solve, the unquantified problem of 
cyberespionage.”62  Perhaps due to this opposition, the controversial 
ex parte seizure provision was significantly modified to include 
requirements that renders such relief more difficult to award.63 
 
 58. Corey Bennett, Trade Secret Bill Targets Local Theft, Not Foreign 
Snooping, HILL (Dec. 2, 2015, 1:43 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity 
/261807-trade-secret-bill-targets-local-theft-not-foreign-snooping (“[L]awmakers 
pointed to the inability of American companies to go after current and former 
employees who steal trade secrets, such as a secret recipe or a customer list.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Eric Goldman et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 1890, H.R. 3326) (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2699760 [hereinafter 
Professors’ 2015 Letter]; see also David S. Levine et al., Professors’ Letter in 
Opposition to the “Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014” (S. 2267) and the “Trade 
Secret Protection Act of 2014” (H.R. 5233) (Aug. 26, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2699735 [hereinafter 
Professors’ 2014 Letter].  Both authors were among the drafters of the professors’ 
letters in opposition to the DTSA. 
 60. See Professors’ 2015 Letter, supra note 59; Professors’ 2014 Letter, supra 
note 59.  See generally Chow, supra note 12; Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act, supra note 12; Levine & Sandeen, supra note 12; 
Seaman, supra note 12. 
 61. See Professors’ 2015 Letter, supra note 59, at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
 62. Levine & Sandeen, supra note 12, at 240–41. 
 63. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9, at 849–51 (explaining the process 
that led to the modification of the ex parte seizure requirements).  
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In May 2016, the DTSA became law.64  The DTSA allows trade 
secret owners to bring a civil action in federal court for trade secret 
misappropriation.65  Structurally, the DTSA is similar in many 
respects to the UTSA, including the requirements for establishing the 
existence of a trade secret, an improper act, and use and/or disclosure 
of the trade secret.66  Indeed, the law’s sponsors argued that the DTSA 
was not intended to “alter the balance of current trade secret law or 
alter specific court decisions.”67  However, there are several 
significant differences between the DTSA and state law, including an 
ex parte seizure remedy68 and limited protections for 
whistleblowers.69  In addition, the DTSA confers original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts;70 thus, state courts can also 
hear claims under the DTSA.71 
 
Notwithstanding these changes, the concern about the ex parte seizure provision 
remains, as the concern is the chilling effect of receiving a letter containing such 
a threat.  See Levine & Sandeen, supra note 12, at 255 (“Even if the [DTSA] 
include[s] heightened requirements in order to obtain a seizure order, the courts 
may never get the chance to adjudicate the issue.  Rather, the adjudication may 
happen in the marketplace, where the recipient of a trade secret troll’s letter 
(which would threaten a seizure action) will have to decide if it has the capacity 
and resources to challenge the claim in court.  If it does not—which would be the 
case for many potential recipients of such letters, from start-ups to struggling 
companies—the practical impact could be a settlement payment and, potentially, 
the end of the business.”). 
 64. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1832–1833, 1385–1836, 1838–1839, 1961 (West 2018)). 
 65. Goldman, supra note 2 (stating that the DTSA “gives trade secret owners 
a new and powerful option to bring trade secret lawsuits using federal law, 
whereas before only state law authorized their lawsuits”). 
 66. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1836(b)(2), 1839(3)–(5); see also Sandeen & Seaman, supra 
note 9, at 857 (“Since the DTSA is modeled after the UTSA, incorporating several 
of its provisions verbatim, some appear to assume that the two will be interpreted 
and applied consistently.”); Mark Ridgway & Taly Dvorkis, A Comparison of the 
EU Trade Secrets Directive and the US Defend Trade Secrets Act, PATENTLY-O 
(May 16, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/05/comparison-secrets 
-directive.html (“[T]o be considered a trade secret the information must be kept 
confidential and derive an economic value from the fact that it is confidential.”). 
 67. S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016). 
 68. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2). 
 69. Id. § 1833(b); see also Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9, at 852 (“In 
addition, Senators Charles Grassley (Iowa) and Patrick Leahy (Vermont) offered 
a new amendment intended to ‘provide protection to whistleblowers who disclose 
trade secrets to law enforcement in confidence for the purpose of reporting or 
investigating a suspected violation of law.’”). 
 70. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(c). 
 71. Of course, if a trade secret owner asserts a DTSA claim in state court, 
the defendants may remove the case to federal court.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446 
(2012).  There are other wrinkles to the DTSA, as well as practice variances, 
which are beyond the scope of this Article.  For example, one North Carolina law 
firm explained that trade secret plaintiffs may prefer to utilize North Carolina 
trade secret law instead of the DTSA because awardable damages may be greater 
under North Carolina law.  See Brian L. Church, Congress Enacts the Defend 
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In sum, the DTSA has been described as a “wake-up call” to 
companies that value and protect their IP as trade secrets.72  As a 
result, one can reasonably expect that the DTSA will continue to be 
utilized by trade secret plaintiffs and interpreted by both federal and 
state courts.  However, the details of the DTSA’s early use, as 
described in Part IV, indicate that the DTSA may not be achieving as 
much as was predicted by its sponsors, particularly with respect to 
cyberespionage by foreign actors, and suggest trends that may not 
have been predicted prior to the DTSA’s enactment. 
C. Empirical Research Regarding Trade Secrecy 
As previously mentioned, trade secret law operates in a relative 
empirical information vacuum.  While other IP law doctrines like 
copyright and patent have benefitted from an active and growing body 
of both theoretical and empirical work upon which to understand 
their parameters,73 trade secrecy remains understudied.74  In 
particular, despite being a heavily litigated area of IP law,75 trade 
secrecy has received very little attention from empirical scholars.76  
 
Trade Secrets Act: Time to Revisit Employment Agreements and Protection of 
Confidential Information, ROBINSON BRADSHAW (June 28, 2016), 
http://www.robinsonbradshaw.com/newsroom-publications-375.html (“[F]or the 
time being, the DTSA may not have much effect in steering traditional state law 
cases into the federal forum.  For one, North Carolina law provides for treble 
damages for trade secret misappropriation, while the DTSA provides only for 
double damages on a showing of willful and malicious misappropriation.”). 
 72. Manny Schecter, The Changing Trade Secret and Patent Equilibrium, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 20, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/20/the-changing 
-trade-secret-and-patent-equilibrium. 
 73. Examples of recent patent and copyright scholarship include Colleen V. 
Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 1315 (2011); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital 
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing 
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010); and Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand 
Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 684 (2012). 
 74. For the most cited trade secret law review articles, which is a 
significantly shorter list than comparable lists for copyright, patents, and 
trademarks, see Ted Sichelman, Most-Cited IP Law Articles Published in the Last 
10 Years, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2016/03/most-cited-ip-law-articles 
-published-in.html. 
 75. Almeling et al., supra note 23, at 293 (“[T]rade secret cases doubled in 
the seven years from 1988 to 1995, and doubled again in the nine years from 1995 
to 2004.  At the projected rate, trade secret cases will double again by 2017.”).  
For an argument that trade secrets can be justified as a form of IP, as opposed to 
traditional property, see generally Lemley, supra note 29. 
 76. See Risch, supra note 7 (“[T]he reality is that we know very little about 
trade secrets, despite the best efforts of a handful of scholars conducting research 
in this area.”).  See generally Levine & Sichelman, supra note 7. 
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There are few major empirical studies of trade secret law or litigation 
involving trade secrets, and most are dated.77  Similarly, while there 
has been some excellent theoretical and policy analysis regarding 
trade secret law and its role in innovation policy,78 many more 
scholars focus on copyright, patent, and trademark law.79 
Among the reasons for trade secrecy’s scant treatment by 
scholars are its aforementioned state law status80 and the general 
reticence of companies to disclose their trade secret practices and 
misappropriations.81  Additionally, as trade secrecy often fills in the 
gaps between other forms of IP protection82 and has no registration 
requirement with a governmental body,83 it is a challenging area for 
empirical study.  For example, because trade secrecy overlaps heavily 
with employment law in areas like covenants not to compete and the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine,84 crafting empirical trade secret 
studies that would not be subsumed in contract and employment law 
concepts requires careful tailoring and analysis. 
 
 77. See, e.g., Almeling et al., supra note 23; Almeling et al., supra note 25; 
Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987); Wesley M. Cohen 
et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why 
U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf; Bronwyn 
H. Hall et al., The Choice Between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A 
Literature Review (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17983, 
2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17983; Joshua Lerner, Using Litigation to 
Understand Trade Secrets: A Preliminary Exploration (Aug. 7, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=922520.  For more recent empirical work on trade secrecy, see, for example, 
NATHAN WAJSMAN & FRANCISCO GARCIA-VALERO, EU INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, 
PROTECTING INNOVATION THROUGH TRADE SECRETS AND PATENTS: DETERMINANTS 
FOR EUROPEAN UNION FIRMS (2017), https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnelweb/secure 
/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/reports/Trade 
%20Secrets%20Report_en.pdf; Levine & Sichelman, supra note 7. 
 78. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 29; Lemley, supra note 29; Levine, supra note 
20; Risch, supra note 29; Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to 
First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of Federal 
Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299 (2008); see also Robert G. Bone, 
The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (2014) 
(responding to Professor Lemley’s article). 
 79. See Sichelman, supra note 74 (listing the most-cited scholars in these 
doctrines). 
 80. See supra Subpart II.A. 
 81. See generally Levine & Sichelman, supra note 7. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See Robert Klinck, Keeping Your Trade Secrets Secret, KLINCK LLC, 
https://www.klinckllc.com/trade-secrets/keeping-trade-secrets-secret (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2018) (“Because trade secrets do not require registration or any kind of 
application, they are arguably an inexpensive form of intellectual property.”). 
 84. See Sandeen, supra note 12, at 320 (“The remedies provision of the DTSA 
contains language that, at once, might be interrupted to both endorse and reject 
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.”). 
 
W06_LEVINESEAMAN.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/18 8:43 PM 
122 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
Existing empirical studies, although limited, have indicated 
some basic trends that are worth noting in the context of 
understanding the DTSA’s impact.  The ability of companies to 
acquire knowledge and employees, and therefore become “disruptors” 
in the market sense of the word, is directly related to their willingness 
to employ and deploy trade secrecy.85  To the extent that a company 
is engaged in businesses where reverse engineering is a primary 
concern, like pharmaceuticals, the prevalence of trade secrecy 
diminishes.86  Additionally, it is difficult to market the existence of 
valuable trade secrets within a firm to its investors.  Thus, some 
studies theorize that companies use trade secrecy primarily in the 
initial research and development (“R&D”) phase and later move 
toward patenting as a way to publicly disclose their potential for 
success to investors.87  At the same time, other studies find that 
small- and medium-sized entities are less likely to use patents and 
prefer secrecy due to the cost of patenting and the desire to be first to 
market.88  Particularly where a company perceives that it has a 
strong advantage in R&D over competitors, it may prefer trade 
secrecy to maintain that advantage.89 
 
 85. See Marcus Holgersson, Patent Management in Entrepreneurial SMEs: 
A Literature Review and an Empirical Study of Innovation Appropriation, Patent 
Propensity, and Motives, 43 R&D MGMT. 21, 33 (2013) (“[P]atents can be used as 
an internal governance tool . . . safeguarding . . . the knowledge and intellectual 
capital of the investment object, often centered among a few single individuals.”). 
 86. See Alexandra K. Zaby, Losing the Lead: The Patenting Decision in the 
Light of the Disclosure Requirement, 19 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 147, 
159–60 (2010) (“In an industry sector with a high propensity to patent, such as 
[p]harmaceuticals[,] the easiness of reverse engineering is rather high so that the 
effective headstart of an inventor is low.”  (emphasis omitted)). 
 87. See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 7 (manuscript at 9) (“Thus, keeping 
information secret in the R&D stage is a particularly strong reason for startups 
to use trade secrecy, especially if the trade secret is the firm’s sole asset.” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also R. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets v. Patents: The New 
Calculus, LANDSLIDE, July/Aug. 2010, at 10, 11 (“The birth of every patent starts 
out as a trade secret.  At the time of conception, the idea or information can only 
be protected by keeping it secret.  However, a subsequent decision needs to be 
made to determine whether or not to convert the trade secrets . . . into a 
patent . . . .”). 
 88. See Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy 
for Appropriation, 30 RES. POL’Y 611, 615 fig.1 (2001) (surveying 2,849 R&D-
performing firms and finding that lead-time advantage is far more important 
than patents). 
 89. See Pia Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Kaisu Puumalainen, Nature and 
Dynamics of Appropriability: Strategies for Appropriating Returns on Innovation, 
37 R&D MGMT. 95, 106 (2007) (finding a positive relationship between seeking 
short-term value, the use of lead time, and secrecy). 
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
This Part describes the methodology employed by the authors to 
empirically analyze the first year of litigation under the DTSA.  It 
first summarizes the objective of our empirical study.  Next, it 
explains the study design, including the process used for identifying 
relevant cases and collecting and coding data regarding these cases.  
Finally, it notes some potential limitations of the study and its 
methodology. 
A. Objectives 
The principal objective of this study is to provide a detailed 
empirical assessment of trade secret litigation in federal court under 
the DTSA.  Through this examination, it attempts to better 
understand how litigants are employing this new law to pursue 
judicial relief for alleged trade secret misappropriation. 
In particular, this study seeks to empirically evaluate several 
claims about the need for the DTSA and whether it is achieving the 
goals of its sponsors at this early stage.  For example, the DTSA’s 
proponents frequently pointed to the problem of theft of trade secrets 
stored in a digital format, such as by hacking into computer 
systems.90  They also focused heavily on the peril of trade secret 
misappropriation allegedly committed by foreign actors and entities, 
especially from China.91  In addition, they stressed the need for 
stronger civil remedies to prevent the disclosure and dissemination of 
trade secrets, most notably expedited judicial relief via the ex parte 
seizure of property containing trade secret information.92  The 
 
 90. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 3 (2016) (“Trade secrets are an integral 
part of a company’s competitive advantage in today’s economy, and with the 
increased digitization of critical data and increased global trade, this information 
is highly susceptible to theft.”); S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2 (2016) (“Protecting trade 
secrets has become increasingly difficult given ever-evolving technological 
advancements.  Thieves are using increasingly sophisticated methods to steal 
trade secrets and the growing use of technology and cyberspace has made trade 
secret theft detection particularly difficult.”); 162 CONG. REC. S1626 (daily ed. 
Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar) (“Thumb drives and the cloud have 
replaced filing cabinets for storage [of] information, making stealing a trade 
secret as easy as clicking a button or touching a screen.”). 
 91. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 4 (recognizing the “significant and growing 
threat presented by criminals who engage in espionage on behalf of foreign 
adversaries and competitors” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 12-610, at 1 (2012))); 162 
CONG. REC. S7251 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. Coons) (“There is no 
doubt that China and other foreign competitors are working furiously to steal 
American innovation . . . .  That is why Congress must act now to pass 
the . . . Defend Trade Secrets Act.”). 
 92. See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (“[The DTSA] also provides for expedited 
relief on an ex parte basis in the form of a seizure of property from the party 
accused of misappropriation, a remedy available under extraordinary 
circumstances where necessary to preserve evidence or prevent dissemination of 
a trade secret.  The ex parte seizure provision is an important remedy for trade 
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frequency of claims involving cyberespionage, cases against foreign 
defendants, and ex parte seizure orders in DTSA litigation can help 
assess whether these goals have been met. 
B. Study Design and Data Collection 
An original dataset of DTSA claims was created for this study.93  
We sought to identify all federal court cases where a claim of trade 
secret misappropriation under the DTSA was made in the first year 
following the law’s passage (i.e., from May 11, 2016, until May 11, 
2017).94  This was a time-intensive process, as no comprehensive 
database of DTSA cases is publicly available.  In addition, Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”), the federal courts’ 
online docketing system, does not specifically identify cases as 
involving a DTSA claim, unlike suits filed under patent, copyright, or 
trademark law.95 
As a result, we conducted searches in several commercial legal 
databases to help identify relevant DTSA cases.  The primary 
resource used was Bloomberg Law.96  For our purposes, Bloomberg 
Law is markedly superior to PACER.97  First, it allows full-text 
searches of entire court dockets, whereas PACER is limited to certain 
types of queries (such as party names, case numbers, and nature of 
 
secret owners . . . .”); see also supra notes 60–63 (further explaining the ex parte 
seizure provisions of the DTSA). 
 93. The data collected for this study will be made publicly available at the 
following website upon publication: DTSA LITIGATION, 
http://www.dtsalitigation.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).  See Robin Feldman et 
al., Open Letter on Ethical Norms in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 339, 348 (2016) (recommending that “data needed to replicate the 
results in a published empirical paper should be made accessible to other 
academics at the time the paper is published”); see also Gregory Mitchell, 
Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 176 
(2004) (recommending that law reviews require disclosure of “raw data for 
replication and review” for empirical legal scholarship). 
 94. As described below, most of these cases involved a DTSA claim made by 
a plaintiff, but a few involved a counterclaim or third-party claim made by a 
defendant.  See infra text accompanying note 195. 
 95. This is done through an NOS code selected by attorneys on a Civil Cover 
Sheet at the time of the case’s filing.  See, e.g., FORM JS 44, CIVIL COVER SHEET 
(June 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/js_044_1.pdf.  Empirical 
scholars who study litigation for various areas of the law (e.g., employment, 
criminal, and patent) commonly use NOS codes to identify relevant cases.  See 
Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, The Use and Reliability of Federal Nature 
of Suit Codes, MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4–7), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000386. 
 96. Dockets, BLOOMBERG LAW, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/dockets (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2018). 
 97. See Mindy Kent, Records, Briefs & Court Filings, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR., 
http://guides.library.harvard.edu/recordsandbriefs (last updated Mar. 29, 2018) 
(“BloombergLaw is your best starting point for access to electronically available 
federal and state case filings.”). 
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suit (“NOS”) codes).  Second, Bloomberg Law permits simultaneous 
searches of all federal district courts, while PACER requires separate 
searches for each court.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, the 
full text of pleadings and other court documents for many cases is 
searchable in Bloomberg Law, unlike in PACER.98  Using broad 
search criteria,99 we reviewed all results generated by Bloomberg Law 
and identified 473 cases that raised a DTSA claim.  We also searched 
databases of district court opinions in WestlawNext100 and Lexis 
Advance101 to identify an additional 13 cases that raised a DTSA 
claim.  In total, our dataset comprises 486 federal cases. 
Next, each case in the dataset was hand coded for a variety of 
information using a standardized set of coding instructions, which 
was a time-intensive process.102  The coded variables fall into several 
categories.103  We first coded for basic case information, including the 
names of the plaintiff104 and defendant,105 the date that the pleading 
asserting the DTSA claim was filed,106 the district court where the 
 
 98. KENT C. OLSON, PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL RESEARCH 300 (2d ed. 2015) (“The 
full text of documents that have been downloaded through Bloomberg are 
searchable, making it easy to search for particular motions or arguments.”). 
 99. Dockets, supra note 96.  In Bloomberg Law, we searched all U.S. district 
court dockets for the date range of 05/11/2016 to 05/11/2017 using the following 
terms: “defend trade secrets act” OR DTSA OR (18 w/5 “U.S.C.” w/5 (1831! or 
1832! or 1833! or 1834! or 1835! or 1836! or 1837! or 1838! or 1839!)). 
 100. WESTLAWNEXT, https://next.westlaw.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2018).  In 
WestlawNext, we searched all federal district court decisions since May 11, 2016, 
using the following terms: “defend trade secrets act” OR DTSA or (18 /5 u.s.c. /5 
(1831! or 1832! or 1833! or 1834! or 1835! or 1836! or 1837! or 1838! or 1839!)). 
 101. LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).  In 
Lexis Advance, we searched all federal district court decisions since May 11, 
2016, using the following terms: “defend trade secrets act” OR (18 /4 u.s.c. /5 1831 
1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839). 
 102. The coding process took several hundred hours of time in the aggregate.  
See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: 
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 829 
(2002) (“Unfortunately, data gathering is frequently labor-intensive and time-
consuming and, consequently, often quite expensive.”  (footnote omitted)). 
 103. Variable names are listed in brackets in the following footnotes. 
 104. This was coded as a string (text) variable [plaintiff], with the named 
party abbreviated under The Bluebook if appropriate.  If multiple plaintiffs 
existed, only the first named plaintiff was used. 
 105. This was coded as a string variable [defendant], with the named party 
abbreviated under The Bluebook if appropriate.  If multiple defendants existed, 
only the first named defendant was used. 
 106. This variable [date] was coded in the following format: MM/DD/YYYY.  
In situations where the DTSA claim was asserted in something other than the 
original complaint—for example, a case originally filed in federal court before the 
DTSA’s enactment to which the plaintiff subsequently added a DTSA claim in an 
amended complaint—the date of the amended pleading that added the DTSA 
claim was used. 
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case was filed,107 the case’s docket number,108 the judge initially 
assigned to the case,109 and the NOS code.110 
We then coded for various information typically contained in the 
plaintiff’s complaint (or, in a few cases, in a counterclaim or third-
party claim by a defendant that alleged a DTSA violation).  Although 
a complaint contains only allegations, not factual findings or legal 
conclusions like a court opinion, it nonetheless can be a valuable 
source of information for empirical research.111  Under the Federal 
 
 107. This was initially coded as a string variable [court] using a three- or four-
letter abbreviation consistent with PACER.  For example, the Northern District 
of California was abbreviated as “CAND.”  See CM/ECF Filer or PACER Login, 
U.S. DISTRICT CT., N. DISTRICT CAL., https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2018).  This variable was then encoded into a separate, 
categorical (numeric) variable [court_n] for purposes of data analysis.  Note that 
both variables only reflect the court where the case was originally filed (or, in a 
handful of cases, removed to from state court); they do not capture any 
subsequent transfers to another district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012). 
 108. This variable [docket] was coded in the following format: N:NN-CV-
NNNN (where N is a number). 
 109. This was coded as a string variable [judge]. 
 110. This variable [nos] was coded as a three-digit number.  See ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, NATURE OF SUIT (n.d.), https://www.pacer.gov 
/documents/natsuit.pdf; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining 
NOS codes). 
 111. For other empirical studies that use complaints as a data source, see, for 
example, Christina L. Boyd et al., Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of 
Causes of Action in Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 253 (2013) 
(examining the breadth of pleading and the interrelationship among causes of 
action in civil complaints); Jason A. Cantone et al., Whither Notice Pleading? 
Pleading Practice in the Days Before Twombly, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 23 (2014) 
(studying pleading practice in federal courts prior to Twombly); Theodore 
Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982) (examining the contents of complaints in civil rights 
cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 
14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227 (2004) (studying allegations of willful infringement in 
patent complaints); A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An 
Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 142 (2005) (empirically analyzing 
complaints under federal securities litigation statutes); Alexander A. Reinert, 
The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011) (examining the 
connection between merits and pleadings by providing empirical data from 
appellate and trial court pleadings and decisions in order to “question the 
widespread assumptions about the costs and benefits of heightened pleading”); 
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003) (examining 
the content of complaints in prisoner civil rights litigation); William Bennett 
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the 
Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979) (examining the content of complaints 
in prisoner civil rights litigation); Colleen McNamara, Note, Iqbal as Judicial 
Rorschach Test: An Empirical study of District Court Interpretations of Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 401 (2011) (analyzing 10% of the federal district court 
complaints and subsequent decisions that cited Iqbal in order to determine 
whether the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal created a workable 
pleading standard that is applicable uniformly across the federal circuits;  
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Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint is required to provide “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief” as well as “the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.”112  In 
addition, under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly113 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,114 a plaintiff must plead 
sufficient facts to demonstrate that the asserted claims are 
plausible.115 
In trade secret cases, this means the complaint must include 
enough factual detail that, if true, would plausibly satisfy several 
prerequisites for relief under the DTSA, including the existence of a 
trade secret,116 ownership by the plaintiff(s),117 use of the trade secret 
in connection with interstate or foreign commerce,118 and 
misappropriation by the defendant(s).119  For instance, “the plaintiff 
cannot simply state that a trade secret [is] involved.”120  Rather, the 
complaint must include sufficient information about the alleged trade 
secret—including whether it has “independent economic value” and 
whether the owner took sufficient steps to protect its alleged 
 
specifically analyzing courts’ interpretations of the “factual sufficiency” of a 
complaint as well as their subsequent analysis of said complaint). 
 112. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 113. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 114. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 115. See id. at 678 (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’  A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
570)). 
 116. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (West 2018) (defining the term “trade secret,” 
including the requirement that the trade secret has “independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, another person,” and that the trade secret 
owner “has taken reasonable precautions to keep such information secret”). 
 117. See id. § 1836(b)(1) (authorizing “[a]n owner of a trade secret that is 
misappropriated” to bring a “civil action”); see also id. § 1839(4) (defining the 
“owner” of a trade secret as one who has “legal or equitable title in, or license to, 
the trade secret”). 
 118. See id. § 1836(b)(1) (requiring that “the trade secret [be] related to a 
product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign 
commerce”). 
 119. See id. § 1839(5) (defining misappropriation of a trade secret); see also id. 
§ 1839(6) (defining “improper means” for acquiring a trade secret). 
 120. Evans, supra note 12, at 191. 
 
W06_LEVINESEAMAN.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/18 8:43 PM 
128 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
secret121—to make the claim viable.122  Similarly, the complaint must 
plausibly plead that the defendant committed an act of 
misappropriation by improperly acquiring, disclosing, or using the 
alleged trade secret.123  This can be established, for example, by 
alleging that the defendant breached a nondisclosure agreement 
(“NDA”)124 or that he or she downloaded the alleged trade secret 
information onto a flash drive in violation of company policy for 
subsequent use in a new job.125  Finally, above and beyond what is 
mandated by the pleading requirements, trade secret plaintiffs may 
elect to include more detailed allegations about the nature of their 
valuable trade secret information and the defendant’s nefarious 
 
 121. See id. at 193–94 (“The specific sub-elements to the DTSA trade secret 
definition require that the trade secret information (1) have independent 
economic value, actual or potential; (2) not be generally known to another person 
who would benefit from it; (3) not be readily ascertainable through proper means; 
and (4) be the subject of reasonable measures to maintain secrecy.”); see also M.C. 
Dean, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 199 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2016) 
(dismissing the plaintiff’s DTSA claim because it “fail[ed] to allege it took 
reasonable steps to protect the secrecy of the information at issue, thus failing to 
satisfy the definition of trade secret”). 
 122. See, e.g., AutoTrakk, LLC v. Auto. Leasing Specialists, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-
01981, 2017 WL 2936730, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 2017) (dismissing the plaintiff’s 
DTSA claim without prejudice because it “pleads insufficient factual material to 
determine whether . . . a trade secret plausibly existed”); Molon Motor & Coil 
Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL 1954531, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
May 11, 2017) (explaining that the complaint “require[s] some concreteness and 
specificity” about the trade secrets allegedly misappropriated under the DTSA); 
see also Am. Registry, LLC v. Hanaw, No. 2:13-cv-352-FtM-29UAM, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 171889, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2013) (deeming “broad and generic 
categories of information” insufficient to provide “notice as to the actual trade 
secrets misappropriated” in a state law trade secrets case).  However, the trade 
secret “need not be disclosed in [such] detail in a complaint” that it “would result 
in the public disclosure of the purported trade secret[].”  Mission Measurement 
Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 915, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (quoting 
AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2001)); see also 
Priority Assist, Inc., v. Stockard & Assocs., No. 4:15-CV-02970, 2016 WL 
4479529, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2016) (finding that the plaintiffs “specified 
what is plausibly a trade secret” by identifying broad categories of information, 
such as “business information, customer lists and agreements, and market share 
data,” allegedly misappropriated by the defendant). 
 123. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(5) (defining misappropriation of a trade secret); 
see also GeometWatch Corp. v. Hall, No. 1:14-CV-00060-JNP-PMW, 2017 WL 
1136946, at *9 (D. Utah Mar. 27, 2017) (dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint 
because it “failed to offer non-conclusory fact-based allegations that support even 
an inference that any [defendant] improperly used or disclosed [plaintiff]’s trade 
secrets”). 
 124. See, e.g., Melville Capital, LLC v. Tenn. Commerce Bank, No. 3:11-CV-
00888, 2011 WL 6888476, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 29, 2011). 
 125. See, e.g., Molon Motor & Coil Corp., 2017 WL 1954531, at *4–5. 
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conduct to begin persuading the judge regarding the merits of their 
claim or to induce a favorable pretrial settlement.126 
We coded the following variables for each complaint.  First, we 
coded the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, as asserted by the plaintiff.  
This included both federal question jurisdiction127 (which is 
applicable for all complaints raising a DTSA claim) as well as 
diversity jurisdiction.128  We also coded for assertions of supplemental 
jurisdiction over related state law claims.129  In addition, we coded for 
cases where a DTSA claim was originally filed in state court and 
subsequently removed by the defendant to federal court130 as well as 
for cases where the DTSA claim was asserted by a nominal defendant 
in a counterclaim.131 
Next, we coded complaints for all other (non-DTSA) causes of 
action.  For federal law,132 this included claims arising under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”);133 patent law;134 copyright 
law;135 the Lanham Act;136 federal antitrust law;137 the Racketeer 
 
 126. See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring 
Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 11–12, 40–44 (2009) 
(describing complaints as “tool[s] of tactical advantage” in litigation and asserting 
that sufficient detail should be included in them to convey the plaintiff’s 
narrative); Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old Story: Using Narrative Theory to 
Understand and Overcome the Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 1, 33 (2014) (“Specific factual detail, whether an individual detail or a 
multitude of elaborate detail, can have very effective persuasive power.”); Koan 
Mercer, Comment, “Even in These Days of Notice Pleadings”: Factual Pleading 
Requirements in the Fourth Circuit, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1167, 1194 n.140 (2004) 
(“Laying out a factually detailed and persuasive case in the complaint may also 
serve a negotiation posturing function.”). 
 127. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).  This was coded as a binary variable [jur_fq]. 
 128. See id. § 1332.  This was coded as a binary variable [jur_div].  Numerous 
cases pleaded diversity jurisdiction as well as federal question jurisdiction. 
 129. See id. § 1367.  This was coded as a binary variable [jur_supp]. 
 130. See id. §§ 1441, 1446.  This was coded as a binary variable [remove]. 
 131. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)–(b).  This was coded as a binary variable 
[counterclaim]. 
 132. All federal law causes of action were initially coded as categorical 
variables [fedlaw1 to fedlaw3].  From this data, the authors created binary 
(dummy) variables for the most common causes of action for purposes of data 
analysis.  See infra notes 133–39. 
 133. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).  This was coded as a binary variable [cfaa]. 
 134. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  This was coded as a binary variable [patent]. 
 135. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  This was coded as a binary variable [copyright].  
Claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 
(2012), were classified as copyright claims. 
 136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012).  This was coded as a binary variable 
[lanham].  Claims coded as arising under the Lanham Act included trademark 
infringement (for both registered and unregistered markets), unfair competition, 
false advertising, false designation of origin, and cybersquatting under the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012). 
 137. This was coded as a binary variable [antitrust].  This included claims 
under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.  
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Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”);138 and any other 
federal law claims that did not fall into one of these categories.139  
Numerous state law claims were coded as well,140 as the DTSA 
expressly declined to preempt other causes of action.141  Specifically, 
we coded for claims of trade secret misappropriation under state 
law;142 breach of contract (including breach of nondisclosure and/or 
noncompete agreements);143 breach of the implied covenant (or duty) 
of good faith and fair dealing;144 breach of fiduciary duty;145 unfair 
competition;146 conversion;147 tortious interference with contractual 
 
See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012) (declaring illegal “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations . . .”); Clayton Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012) (declaring it unlawful for any 
person engaged in commerce to discriminate on the basis of price, services, or 
facilities); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012) 
(empowering the FTC to prevent unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts in or affecting commerce). 
 138. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968 (2012).  The DTSA made trade secret misappropriation a predicate offense 
for a RICO claim.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 3(b), 
130 Stat. 376, 382 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (West 2018)). 
 139. This was coded as a binary variable [otherfed], and a text field was 
included to describe the claim [otherfednotes]. 
 140. Like federal law claims, state law causes of action were initially coded as 
categorical variables [statelaw1 to statelaw9].  From this data, the authors 
created binary (dummy) variables for the most common causes of action for 
purposes of data analysis.  See infra notes 142–53. 
 141. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (West 2018) (“Except as provided in section 
1833(b) [the whistleblower provision], this chapter shall not be construed to 
preempt or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by 
United States Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the 
misappropriation of a trade secret . . . .”); see also Defend Trade Secret Act of 
2016, § 2(f), 130 Stat. at 382 (“Nothing in the amendments made by this section 
shall be construed to modify the rule of construction under section 1838 of title 
18, United States Code, or to preempt any other provision of law.”).  In contrast, 
the UTSA “displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law . . . providing 
civil liability remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret,” except for 
contractual and criminal remedies.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
 142. This was coded as a binary variable [statets]. 
 143. This was coded as a binary variable [contract]. 
 144. This was coded as a binary variable [goodfaith]. 
 145. This was coded as a binary variable [duty]. 
 146. This was coded as a binary variable [unfaircomp].  We classified claims 
of unfair or deceptive trade practices under state law as a form of unfair 
competition. 
 147. This was coded as a binary variable [conversion]. 
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or business relations;148 unjust enrichment;149 fraud;150 state law 
computer crime or tort;151 and civil conspiracy.152  We also included a 
catch-all category to cover other state law claims that did not fall into 
one of these categories.153 
In addition, we coded all complaints for the type(s) of trade secret 
information allegedly misappropriated.154  The DTSA defines “trade 
secret” expansively as “all forms and types of financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic and engineering information,” 
including formulas, methods, processes, and programs that “derive[] 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known, and not being readily ascertainable through proper 
means . . . by another person who can obtain economic value . . . from 
the information.”155  Specifically, we coded for technical or scientific 
information;156 financial information;157 marketing information;158 
 
 148. This was coded as a binary variable [interfere].  This general category of 
tort encompasses various claims, including tortious interference with contractual 
rights, intentional interference with contractual relations, inducement of breach 
of contract, tortious interference with business relations, and intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage. 
 149. This was coded as a binary variable [unjustenrich]. 
 150. This was coded as a binary variable [fraud].  This variable encompassed 
various fraud-related claims, including fraudulent misrepresentation and 
fraudulent inducement. 
 151. This was coded as a binary variable [statecomp].  According to the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, all 50 states have enacted computer 
crime laws, most of which target unauthorized access to computer systems.  Some 
of these laws also address other types of computer-related con, such as spyware, 
phishing, denial of service attacks, and ransomware.  See Computer Crime 
Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org 
/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/computer-hacking 
-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx. 
 152. This was coded as a binary variable [conspiracy]. 
 153. This was coded as a binary variable [otherstate], and a text field was 
included to describe the claim [otherstatenotes].  Purely remedial “claims” 
without an underlying cause of action, such as injunctive relief, were omitted. 
 154. Types of trade secret information allegedly misappropriated were 
initially coded as categorical variables [secret1 to secret8].  From this data, the 
authors created binary (dummy) variables for each category of trade secret.  See 
infra notes 156–64. 
 155. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3)(B) (West 2018).  The DTSA also requires the owner 
of a trade secret to take “reasonable precautions to keep such information secret.”  
Id. § 1839(3)(A).  The definition of trade secrets in the DTSA is similar but not 
identical to the UTSA; the latter refers to any “information,” while the DTSA only 
covers particular categories of information—namely, “financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic and engineering information.”  Compare UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3).  
As a result, some trade secret scholars (including one coauthor) have argued that 
the DTSA’s definition of “trade secret” may be interpreted less expansively than 
the UTSA’s.  See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9, at 904–05. 
 156. This was coded as a binary variable [technical]. 
 157. This was coded as a binary variable [financial]. 
 158. This was coded as a binary variable [marketing]. 
 
W06_LEVINESEAMAN.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/18 8:43 PM 
132 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
internal business or strategic plans;159 customer lists and other 
customer-related information;160 secret formulas;161 computer 
software;162 so-called “negative” trade secrets (i.e., information about 
what not do, such as unsuccessful research experiments);163 and a 
catch-all category for any other information that did not fall into one 
of these categories.164 
Several additional variables were coded from allegations 
contained in the complaints.165  These included the relationship 
between the parties, such as whether the defendant was a former 
employee or business partner of the plaintiff;166 whether at least one 
defendant was a citizen of a foreign country;167 whether the case 
involved a claim of computer hacking;168 whether one or more 
 
 159. This was coded as a binary variable [busplan]. 
 160. This was coded as a binary variable [customer]. 
 161. This was coded as a binary variable [formula]. 
 162. This was coded as a binary variable [software].  It included any type of 
computer software, program, or algorithm. 
 163. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) 
(explaining that “trade secret” may include “information that has commercial 
value from a negative viewpoint, for example, the results of lengthy and 
expensive research which provides that a certain process will not work”); see also 
Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 387, 388 (2007) (criticizing the concept of liability for negative know-
how because it “is conceptually unworkable and serves mainly as an 
anticompetitive threat to employee mobility”).  This was coded as a binary 
variable [negative]. 
 164. This was coded as a binary variable [othersecret], and a text field was 
included to describe the type of trade secret at issue [othersecretnotes]. 
 165. In addition to the other variables identified in this paragraph, we also 
attempted to code for the type(s) of alleged misappropriation—namely, whether 
the defendant(s) had improperly acquired [acquire], disclosed [disclose], and/or 
used [use] the alleged trade secrets without the owner’s permission.  However, 
we discovered during the coding process that these variables were unable to 
provide much useful information because many complaints contained boilerplate 
asserting all these acts of misappropriation.  As a result, although they are 
included in our dataset, we did not perform any data analysis on these variables. 
 166. This was initially coded as categorical variables [relations1 to 
relations4].  From this data, we created several binary (dummy) variables for 
purposes of data analysis: (1) cases where at least one defendant was a current 
or former employee of the plaintiff(s) [employee]; (2) cases where at least one 
defendant was a current or former business partner of the plaintiff(s) 
[buspartner]; and (3) cases that did not fall into either of these categories (i.e., 
where there was no apparent prior relationship between the parties described in 
the complaint) [otherdefs]. 
 167. This was coded as a binary variable [foreigndef].  In addition, a text field 
was included to identify foreign defendants’ citizenship [country]. 
 168. This was coded as a binary variable [hacking].  Specifically, we classified 
a complaint as involving a hacking claim when the plaintiff(s) asserted that the 
defendant(s) had engaged in economic espionage or accessed the computer 
system, network, or server of a plaintiff without authorization.  Note that claims 
of access of a computer system, network, or server merely in excess of authorized 
access—for example, when a current employee, in violation of company policy, 
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defendants had entered into an NDA or written confidentiality 
agreement;169 and whether one or more defendants had entered into 
a noncompete agreement.170 
The final category of information coded pertained to interim relief 
in DTSA cases.  This was of particular interest because of the 
controversial ex parte seizure remedy contained in the DTSA, which 
was the subject of considerable debate and amendment during the 
legislative process.171  We coded for three types of interim relief that 
can be awarded in federal court for trade secret cases: temporary 
restraining orders (“TROs”);172 preliminary injunctions;173 and ex 
parte seizures.174  For each variable, coders reviewed the docket sheet 
in Bloomberg Law to determine if the alleged trade secret owner(s) 
requested one or more of these forms of relief and, if so, reviewed the 
district court’s decision on the motion.175 
Notably, we did not code for outcomes of the DTSA cases in our 
dataset.  This was because there were few merits decisions at the one-
year anniversary of the DTSA’s enactment, as the vast majority of 
cases were either still pending or had been dismissed prior to 
judgment (i.e., they were settled).176  The subsequent outcomes of 
 
accessed trade secret information on the employer’s server or downloaded trade 
secret information to a personal electronic device—were not considered “hacking” 
claims. 
 169. This was coded as a binary variable [nda]. 
 170. This was coded as a binary variable [noncompete]. 
 171. See Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, supra 
note 12, at 284; Valerie Kahn, The Defend Trade Secrets Act’s Seizure Provisions 
and What They Mean for Employers, NAT’L L. REV. (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/defend-trade-secrets-act-s-seizure 
-provisions-and-what-they-mean-employers; see also Peter J. Toren, The Defend 
Trade Secrets Act, 28 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 3, 6 (2016); James Dowd et 
al., Federalizing Trade Secret Protection: A Close Look at the Ex Parte Seizure 
Provision, CORP. COUNS. (May 23, 2016), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id 
=1202758416397; supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (describing 
opposition to the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision and modifications made to it 
during the legislative process). 
 172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) (authorizing TROs).  This was coded as a 
categorical variable [tro]. 
 173. See id. R. 65(a) (authorizing preliminary injunctions).  This was coded as 
a categorical variable [pi]. 
 174. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2) (West 2018) (authorizing ex parte seizures).  
This was coded as a categorical variable [exparte]. 
 175. If a motion was granted in part and denied in part, it was coded as 
“granted.”  If a motion was entirely denied prior to the case’s termination, it was 
coded as “denied.”  If a motion was still pending at the time of the case’s dismissal 
or the end of data collection, it was coded as “no decision.” 
 176. The authors are aware of only one jury verdict on a DTSA claim during 
the law’s first year.  See Jury Verdict, Dalmatia Import Group, Inc. v. Foodmatch, 
Inc., No. 2:16-CV-02767 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2017) (awarding the plaintiff $500,000 
in damages for its claims under the DTSA and the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act). 
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these cases can be a topic for future empirical research by trade secret 
scholars. 
C. Limitations 
Like all empirical research, the methodology used in this study 
has limitations that could affect the results and implications 
discussed in the following Parts.177  Here, we discuss several potential 
limitations and our efforts to address them. 
The first limitation is that our study involves a review of 
litigation, which is subject to well-known selection bias.  “[T]he 
disputes selected for litigation . . . will constitute neither a random 
nor a representative sample . . . of all disputes.”178  One reason is the 
cost of litigation; “[m]any disputes are resolved before a lawsuit is 
filed” because it is frequently more cost-effective “to settle than to 
litigate.”179  Trade secret litigation can be quite expensive; a recent 
survey of IP attorneys found that the median litigation cost for a trade 
secret case varied from $400,000 (where less than $1 million was at 
risk) to over $1.6 million (where more than $25 million was at risk).180  
As a result, parties may select other methods, such as alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”), to resolve their grievances.181  In addition, 
ADR—which is private—may be desirable to prevent public 
disclosure of the alleged trade secrets.182  Furthermore, many trade 
secret litigants have a preexisting contractual relationship, such as 
 
 177. See Heise, supra note 102, at 849 (“Data, research design, and statistical 
methods frequently enforce limits on what can be properly inferred from the 
results of empirical studies . . . .  Notwithstanding these inherent and structural 
limitations, empirical methodologies are well-positioned to enhance and 
complement traditional legal scholarship.”).  Authors of empirical legal research 
“should discuss limitations on the validity and generalizability of [their] 
findings.”  Mitchell, supra note 93, at 201, 203. 
 178. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984).  The Priest-Klein model is focused on 
empirical studies of outcomes (win rates) in litigation; they define the term 
“litigate” narrowly as only disputes where “a verdict is rendered.”  Id. at 4–6.  
This study, in contrast, looks at all federal court cases involving a DTSA claim. 
 179. Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection 
Bias in Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 75, 79 (1993); see also 
Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and 
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1571 (1989) (“Both sides can save the costs of 
litigation by settling [a] dispute.”). 
 180. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY, at I-197, I-201 (2017). 
 181. See generally Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An 
Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995) (examining reasons why parties 
would choose ADR as opposed to trial). 
 182. See Scott H. Blackman & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 
1728 (1998) (“By the very nature of the issues involved, usually at least one party 
in a trade secret dispute is very concerned about maintaining the secrecy of the 
trade secret or other confidential or proprietary information.”). 
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an employment agreement or business agreement.183  If the contract 
provides for resolution of disputes through mandatory arbitration, 
these cases also typically will not be litigated.184 
Second, it is possible that, despite our best efforts,185 we may 
have failed to identify some cases that raise DTSA claims during the 
study period.  But by conducting broad searches in multiple sources 
involving different types of information (docket sheets, court filings, 
and court decisions), we believe that our methodology has captured 
the vast majority of relevant cases during the study period. 
Third, as previously discussed, complaints—which are the data 
source for the majority of variables in our study—contain only 
allegations by an interested party, not findings of fact by a neutral 
decision maker.  As a result, the information contained within these 
documents is obviously designed to support the plaintiff’s theory of 
the case.  While there are constraints to prevent litigants from 
making frivolous or knowingly false claims in their pleadings, such as 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure186 and the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct,187 unfavorable aspects of the case may be 
downplayed or omitted.  In addition, complaints may be deliberately 
 
 183. See Almeling et al., supra note 23, at 302 tbl.2 (finding that over 90% of 
trade secret disputes decided in federal court from 1950 to 2007 involved either 
a current or former employee or a business partner of the trade secret owner). 
 184. See Gertner, supra note 179, at 77 (“[I]f disputes can only go to 
arbitration if both parties agree to arbitration, the mere fact that the parties 
agree to arbitration may reflect important underlying characteristics of the 
dispute.”); see also Aviation All. Ins. Risk Retention Grp., Inc. v. Polaris Enter. 
Grp., Inc., No. CV 17-35-M-DWM, 2017 WL 2799151, at *4 (D. Mont. June 27, 
2017) (granting a motion to compel arbitration of a DTSA claim); T&S Brass & 
Bronze Works, Inc. v. Slanina, No. CV 6:16-03687-MGL, 2017 WL 1734362, at 
*4, *7 (D.S.C. May 4, 2017) (compelling arbitration of a DTSA claim). Some 
arbitration agreements permit the trade secret owner to obtain injunctive relief 
in court while arbitration is pending.  See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Christopher 
R. Drahozal, The Essential Role of Courts for Supporting Innovation, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 2177, 2196–97 (2014) (discussing contractual franchise agreements that did 
not contain an arbitration clause or contained a carve-out from arbitration for 
“injunctive relief to protect[] . . . trade secrets[] and confidential information”). 
 185. See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text (explaining the 
methodology used to identify cases involving DTSA claims). 
 186. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“By presenting to the court a pleading, . . . an 
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s 
knowledge, information, and belief, . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law . . . 
[and] the factual contentions have evidential support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation . . . .”). 
 187. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983) (“A 
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 
therein, unless there is a basis [in law and fact] for doing so that is not 
frivolous . . . .”); id. r. 3.3(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly[] make a false 
statement of material fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”). 
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vague or ambiguous about certain issues, such as the identification of 
trade secret information, for tactical reasons.188  Furthermore, a 
handful of publicly accessible complaints have significant 
redactions189 that made it difficult or impossible to code some 
variables.190 
In addition, we hand coded many variables in the dataset, which 
is a potential source of error.  For example, if the variables are 
ambiguous or include room for subjectivity, this could result in 
inconsistent application and negatively impact reproducibility.191  
However, this concern can be mitigated by creating, pilot testing, and 
implementing written coding instructions that all coders must follow, 
as was done in this study.192  In addition, one of the coauthors 
personally coded half of the cases in the dataset, and the remaining 
 
 188. See Charles Tait Graves & Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secret 
Claims in Litigation: Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 68, 68 (2006) (“Trade secret plaintiffs rarely provide a precise and complete 
identification of the alleged trade secrets at issue without a court order requiring 
them to do so.  This is a strategy, not an accident.  The tactical advantages a 
plaintiff gains from non-identification are too tempting for a plaintiff to 
voluntarily provide such identification.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Complaint, AptarGroup, Inc. v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co., No. 2:17-
CV-00521 (W.D. Pa. filed Apr. 21, 2017) (redacting information regarding the 
plaintiff’s alleged confidential information and prior contractual agreements); 
Complaint, CrowdStrike, Inc. v. NSS Labs, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-00146-GMS (D. Del. 
Mar. 21, 2017) (redacting information regarding a nondisclosure agreement 
between the parties); Complaint, First W. Capital Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, No. 16-
cv-1961-WJM-MJW (D. Colo. filed Sept. 30, 2016) (redacting part or all of 
fourteen paragraphs regarding the defendant’s alleged misappropriation of trade 
secrets and breach of fiduciary duties and employment agreement); Complaint, 
Congenra Solar, Inc. v. SolarCity Corp., No. 3:16-CV-05481 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 
26, 2016) (redacting the identification of alleged trade secrets, actions taken by 
the plaintiff to protect the alleged secrets from disclosure, and the defendants’ 
alleged acts of misappropriation).  A similar issue exists regarding the redaction 
and nondisclosure of government records regarding trade secret information used 
in public infrastructure.  See Levine, supra note 20. 
 190. When a variable could not be coded due to redactions, a missing value 
was entered and a comment was placed in a text field [notes]. 
 191. See generally Jason Rantanen, Empirical Analyses of Judicial Opinions: 
Methodology, Metrics and the Federal Circuit, 49 CONN. L. REV. 227 (2016) 
(exploring the use of multiple studies to form a complete understanding of the 
Federal Circuit’s patent law decisions). 
 192. In empirical research, written coding instructions are preferred so that 
all coders apply the same criteria for each coding decision.  This promotes 
consistency in coding, and it also serves as “a check against looking, consciously 
or not, for confirmation of predetermined positions.”  Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. 
Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 
81 (2008); see also Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in 1 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321, 325 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., 
2005) (explaining that “the overriding goal of a codebook is to minimize human 
judgment—to leave as little as possible to interpretation”).  The authors’ coding 
instructions are available upon request. 
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cases were coded by law students who were instructed, trained, and 
supervised by the authors to ensure accuracy. 
IV.  RESULTS 
This Part summarizes the key findings from the study described 
in the previous section, primarily through descriptive statistics.  It 
first provides some basic information about the cases filed under the 
DTSA in the first year following its passage.  Next, it summarizes a 
variety of information contained within DTSA pleadings.  Finally, it 
provides some data on interim relief in DTSA cases, including ex 
parte seizures, TROs, and preliminary injunctions. 
A. Case Information 
1. Filings 
As previously discussed, we identified 486 federal court cases 
that raised a DTSA claim during the study period.193  Of these, 15 
(3%) are cases originally filed in state court that were removed to 
federal court by the defendant(s).194  In addition, 9 (2%) of these cases 
involve a DTSA claim raised by a defendant as a counterclaim or 
third-party claim.195 
Notably, DTSA claims were not linear over the study period.196  
Figure 1 below shows the number of DTSA claims asserted per month.  
On average, 35 DTSA claims per month were filed from the DTSA’s 
passage through the end of 2016.197  In contrast, 50 DTSA claims per 
month were filed during 2017.198  Possible explanations for this 
increase in filings include growing awareness of the DTSA since its 
passage as well as several court decisions holding that improper 
 
 193. See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text (discussing the 
methodology used to identify cases); see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 194. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing removal); see also 
DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 195. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing counterclaims); 
see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 196. We coded filing dates of DTSA claims based on the first pleading that 
alleged a cause of action under the DTSA.  For most cases, this was the initial 
complaint.  However, a significant number of cases (albeit a minority) first 
advanced a DTSA claim in an amended complaint; this typically occurred when 
a DTSA claim was added to a lawsuit that was already pending in federal court 
at the time of the DTSA’s passage. 
 197. DTSA claims filed in May 2016 were prorated over the remainder of the 
month because the DTSA’s passage occurred on May 11, 2016.  See DTSA 
LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 198. DTSA claims filed in May 2017 were prorated over the first part of the 
month, as the study period ended on May 11, 2017.  See id. 
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conduct occurring prior to the DTSA’s passage might be actionable 
under the DTSA if it was part of a continuing misappropriation.199 
FIGURE 1: DTSA CLAIMS BY MONTH 
 
It is also interesting to compare DTSA filings to patent cases, as both 
patents and trade secrecy are intended to promote innovation, albeit 
 
 199. See, e.g., Brand Energy & Infrastructure Servs., Inc. v. Irex Contracting 
Grp., No. CV 16-2499, 2017 WL 1105648, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2017) (denying 
a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff’s complaint alleged, as part of a 
continuing misappropriation, that the defendant “used” the plaintiff’s trade 
secrets after the DTSA’s enactment); Adams Arms, LLC v. Unified Weapons Sys., 
Inc., No. 8:16-CV-01503-T-33AEP, 2016 WL 5391394, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 
2016) (denying a motion to dismiss and holding that the plaintiff could pursue a 
claim based on the disclosure of trade secret misappropriation occurring after the 
DTSA’s passage, even if the trade secret information was improperly acquired 
prior to the DTSA); Syntel Sterling Best Shores Mauritius Ltd. v. Trizetto Grp., 
Inc., 15-cv-211 (LGS) (RLE), 2016 WL 5338550, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016) 
(finding viable a continuing misappropriation claim that began preenactment 
because the DTSA defines misappropriation as the “disclosure or use of a trade 
secret” and the complaint alleged that the defendants “continue[d] to use” the 
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in different ways.200  Over 4,500 patent cases were filed in 2016,201 
which is nearly ten times greater than the number of DTSA claims 
filed over our one-year study period.  However, this is something of 
an apples-to-oranges comparison, as the America Invents Act of 2011 
(“AIA”) sharply limited multidefendant patent cases.202 
2. Districts 
The top districts for DTSA claims are listed in Table 1 below.  
Nearly all of the top districts for DTSA claims include major 
metropolitan areas that are home to high-technology hubs and/or 
major corporate headquarters: the Northern District of Illinois 
(Chicago); the Northern District of California (San Francisco and 
Silicon Valley); the Central District of California (Los Angeles); the 
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (New York City); the 
Eastern District of Virginia (suburban D.C.); and the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia).  Also noteworthy is the overall 
distribution of cases: no individual district has more than 10% of all 











 200. See Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 
NW. U. L. REV. 377, 382–83 (2017) (“Patent and trade secret law share the same 
goal of promoting innovation.”); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 
U.S. 470, 484–85 (1970). 
 201. BRIAN C. HOWARD & JASON MAPLES, LEX MACHINA, PATENT LITIGATION 
YEAR IN REVIEW 2016, at 1 (2017), http://www.raklaw.com/wp-content/uploads 
/2017/05/LexMachina-2016-Patent-Litigation-Year-in-Review-1-1.pdf. 
 202. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(d)(1), 125 
Stat. 284, 332–33 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012)); David O. Taylor, 
Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 671 (2013) (“When compared to the 
treatment of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 20 . . . , the AIA makes it more difficult to join 
accused infringers in patent infringement cases . . . .”); see also Christopher 
Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 
676–78 (2013) (reporting that the number of patent cases filed more than doubled 
after the AIA’s passage but the total number of defendants stayed relatively 
constant). 
 203. This calculation excludes district courts in U.S. territories and the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as well as the two federal trial courts with 
specialized jurisdiction (the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of 
International Trade).  See DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
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TABLE 1: TOP DISTRICTS FOR DTSA CLAIMS  (MINIMUM 10 CASES) 
District Cases % 
Northern District of Illinois 43 9% 
Northern District of California 38 8% 
Central District of California 30 6% 
Southern District of New York 29 6% 
Eastern District of Virginia 16 3% 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 15 3% 
Southern District of Florida 15 3% 
District of Colorado 13 3% 
District of Massachusetts 12 2% 
District of Utah 12 2% 
Eastern District of New York 11 2% 
District of New Jersey 11 2% 
District of Delaware 10 2% 
District of Oregon 10 2% 
Eastern District of Michigan 10 2% 
Southern District of California 10 2% 
Western District of Pennsylvania 10 2% 
 
In comparison, unlike DTSA claims, patent litigation is highly 
concentrated in a handful of districts, with the top two fora—the 
Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware—receiving 
nearly half of all patent cases filed in 2016.204  In contrast, these two 
districts have relatively few DTSA claims—the District of Delaware 
had only 2% of all DTSA litigation (10 cases) during the study period, 
while the Eastern District had approximately 1% (7 cases).205 
3. Nature of Suit Codes 
Another significant issue is the nature of suit code designated by 
plaintiffs for cases containing a DTSA claim.206  Unlike patent, 
copyright, and trademark cases, there is no separate NOS code for 
DTSA cases.207  Table 2 below shows the most common NOS code used 





 204. According to one study, in 2016 the Eastern District of Texas saw 1662 
patent cases filed (37% of all patent cases) and the District of Delaware saw 455 
cases filed (10%).  HOWARD & MAPLES, supra note 201, at 4. 
 205. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 206. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining NOS codes). 
 207. Id. at 30. 
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TABLE 2: DTSA CLAIMS BY NATURE OF SUIT CODE 
Nature of 
Suit Code Type of Claim Cases (%) 
190 Contract (Other) 26% 
470 RICO   2% 
820 Copyright   7% 
830 Patent   6% 




Various Other   4% 
 
The most common NOS code (890)—used in nearly half of all 
DTSA cases (45%)—is a catch-all designation for statutory actions 
that do not clearly fall into another category, while the second-most 
common NOS code (190) is for non-specific contract-based claims 
(26%).208  Other frequently used NOS codes include copyright (820) 
(7% of cases), patent (830) (6% of cases), and trademark (840) (8% of 
cases).209  To assist future empirical research in trade secret disputes, 
we recommend that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
create a new NOS code for DTSA litigation. 
B. Pleadings 
As previously described, each pleading asserting a DTSA claim 
was coded for a variety of information.210  The key findings from this 
data are reported below. 
1. Jurisdiction 
One group of variables coded was the asserted bases for subject 
matter jurisdiction in federal court.211  The vast majority, or 96%, of 
all cases with a DTSA claim expressly asserted that jurisdiction 
existed based on the existence of a federal question.212  Also, 44% of 
cases asserted federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship of 
 
 208. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See supra notes 102–10, 127–75 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 212. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).  As previously noted, a small percentage of DTSA 
claims were raised as counterclaims.  Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, 
federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 cannot be based on a counterclaim.  See 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see also 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, The Well-Pleaded Complaint, and 
Federal Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“[F]ederal law 
counterclaims cannot form the sole basis for federal question jurisdiction.”); 
DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
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the litigants.213  In addition, supplemental jurisdiction over related 
state law claims was alleged in 78% of cases.214 
Interestingly, 128 cases in the dataset (26%) appear to lack 
federal court jurisdiction absent the DTSA because the plaintiff 
neither asserted any other federal law claim nor alleged diversity of 
citizenship.215  The remaining 358 cases (74%) would have been 
properly filed in federal court even without the DTSA.216  This 
suggests that the DTSA has expanded access to federal court for some 
trade secret disputes that previously would have been litigated in 
state court, albeit modestly.217 
2. Other Federal Law Claims 
Nearly half of all pleadings in the dataset (45%, or 220 out of 486 
cases) asserted one or more other claims arising under federal law in 
addition to a DTSA claim.218  As shown in Table 3 below, the most 
common non-DTSA federal law claim was the CFAA (20%, 95 
cases),219 followed by claims under the Lanham Act (15%, 73 cases).220  
A number of cases involve other IP claims, including patent (6%, 30 
cases)221 and copyright (8%, 39 cases).222  Less common were claims 
brought under the federal RICO statute (2%, 11 cases)223 and federal 
antitrust law (less than 1%, 2 cases).224  Finally, 13 cases contain 





 213. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (c); DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 214. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Notably, some cases with DTSA claims included state 
law claims but failed to formally plead supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367.  
See DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 215. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Cf. Seaman, supra note 12, at 368–70 (explaining that many trade secret 
cases could be litigated in federal court prior to the DTSA). 
 218. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 219. See supra note 133; see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 220. See supra note 136; see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 221. See supra note 134; see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 222. See supra note 135; see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 223. See supra note 138; see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 224. See supra note 137; see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 225. See supra note 139.  This includes claims under the Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2702 (2012); the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012); and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012).  See also DTSA 
LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
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TABLE 3: NON-DTSA FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS 
Claim Cases % 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 95 20% 
Lanham Act 73 15% 
Copyright 39   8% 
Patent 30   6% 
Civil RICO 11   2% 
Antitrust   2 <1% 
Other federal law claims 13   3% 
3. State Law Claims 
In addition, nearly all cases with a DTSA claim also asserted one 
or more related state law causes of action.226  Unlike the UTSA, which 
expressly “displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other . . . civil 
remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret” (with certain 
exceptions, such as contractual remedies and criminal violations),227 
the DTSA does not preempt other federal or state law claims.228  
These state law claims asserted are listed in Table 4 below. 
TABLE 4: STATE LAW CLAIMS 
Claim Cases % 
State trade secret misappropriation 408 84% 
Breach of contract 341 70% 
Tortious interference 259 53% 
Unfair competition 200 41% 
Breach of fiduciary duty 196 40% 
Conversion 153 31% 
Unjust enrichment 108 22% 
Civil conspiracy   82 17% 
Breach of implied covenant of good faith   48 10% 
Fraud   45   9% 
State computer crimes/torts   41   8% 
Other state law claims 152 31% 
 
 226. Specifically, parties in 480 out of 486 cases in the dataset (99%) asserted 
one or more state law claims in the relevant pleading. 
 227. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).  Some states 
modified or declined to adopt this portion of the UTSA.  See Richard F. Dole, Jr., 
Preemption of Other State Law by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 17 SMU SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 95, 99 (2014).  For instance, Iowa, New Mexico, and Nebraska did 
not enact section 7 of the UTSA, and, as a result, there is no preemption of state 
law claims related to the misappropriation of a trade secret in those states.  See 
IOWA CODE §§ 550.1–.7 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to -507 (2018); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (2018); see also 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517 N.W.2d 
548, 551–52 (Iowa 1994). 
 228. See supra note 141.  The whistleblower provision of the DTSA is an 
exception.  See supra notes 69, 141 and accompanying text. 
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Unsurprisingly, the most frequently raised state law claim was 
trade secret misappropriation, which was raised 84% of the time (408 
out of 486 cases).229  Contract-related claims were common as well.  
Breach of contract was alleged in 70% of pleadings (341 cases),230 and 
the quasi-contractual claim of unjust enrichment (22%, 108 cases)231 
and breach of the implied covenant (or duty) of good faith and fair 
dealing (10%, 48 cases)232 were also repeatedly raised by trade secret 
owners.  In addition, tortious interference with contractual or 
business relations was asserted in slightly over half of all DTSA 
disputes (53%, 259 cases).  Other common tort-related claims were 
unfair competition (41%, 200 cases); breach of a fiduciary duty, such 
as the duty of loyalty (40%, 196 cases); conversion (31%, 153 cases); 
civil conspiracy (17%, 82 cases); and fraud (9%, 45 cases).  An 
additional 8% of pleadings (41 cases) asserted a violation of a state 
computer crime statute.233  Finally, other state law causes of action 
not listed above were raised 31% of the time (152 cases).234 
4. Type of Trade Secret Information Allegedly Misappropriated 
We also studied the type of trade secret information that was 
allegedly misappropriated.  As previously discussed, trade secret 
information is defined expansively under both state law and the 
DTSA.235  As one leading treatises has explained, “[V]irtually any 
subject matter of information can be a trade secret” if the statutory 
 
 229. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See supra note 149; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched 
at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution.”); Douglas Laycock, 
Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 931 (2012) (explaining 
that “[q]uasi-contract [is] the nineteenth-century name for the common law’s 
response to cases of what we would now call unjust enrichment”); DTSA 
LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 232. See supra note 144; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”); DTSA 
LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 233. See supra note 151; see also Christine LiCalzi, Computer Crimes, 54 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1025, 1063 (2017) (“Every state has enacted some form of computer-
specific criminal legislation.”); DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93.  
 234. See supra note 153; see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93.  Other state 
law claims included the following: accounting, aiding and abetting, declaratory 
judgment, defamation, false advertising, inducement of breach of contract, 
injunctive relief, intentional and/or negligent nondisclosure, misappropriation of 
confidential or proprietary information, negligence, promissory estoppel, 
quantum meruit, replevin, specific performance, trademark infringement under 
state or common law, trespass to chattels, usurpation of business opportunity, 
and violation of state franchise law. 
 235. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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requirements are met.236  Accordingly, we created several broad 
categories of trade secret information and attempted to classify each 
allegedly misappropriated trade secret into one of these categories.237  
Table 5 below summarizes our findings on this issue. 
TABLE 5: ALLEGEDLY MISAPPROPRIATED TRADE SECRETS 
Trade Secret Cases % 
Customer list/information 284 58% 
Business information (including financial data, 
marketing information, and business plans) 280 58% 
Technical information 189 39% 
Software/algorithm 105 22% 
Formula   37   8% 
“Negative” knowledge/know-how     6   1% 
 
The leading categories of allegedly misappropriated trade secret 
information were customer lists and other customer information 
(58%, 284 cases) and business information (58%, 280 cases).238  
Alleged misappropriation of technical information was somewhat less 
frequent, occurring in nearly 40% of DTSA claims (189 cases).239  But 
in general, these results are similar to earlier studies of trade secret 
litigation under state law, which found that customer lists, internal 
business information, and technical knowledge were the most widely 
misappropriated types of trade secrets.240  Less common were 
allegations of misappropriation of computer software/algorithms 
(22%, 105 cases)241 and so-called “negative” trade secrets (1%, 6 
 
 236. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1.02(F) 
(5th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2017). 
 237. See supra notes 156–64 and accompanying text.  Many pleadings alleged 
that more than one type of trade secret had been misappropriated. 
 238. Because there was a high degree of overlap in assertions of 
misappropriation regarding trade secrets that involved financial data, marketing 
information and plans, and business plans, and because it was sometimes 
difficult to clearly distinguish between these categories (for example, financial 
information and/or marketing strategies included in a business plan), we 
combined these variables for purposes of reporting.  See supra notes 157–59 and 
accompanying text; see also DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 239. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 240. See Almeling et al., supra note 23, at 304 tbl.3 (studying trade secret 
cases decided in federal court in 2008 and finding that technical information and 
know-how were at issue in 35% of the cases, internal business information was 
at issue in 35% of the cases, and customer lists were at issue in 31% of the cases); 
Almeling et al., supra note 25, at 72 tbl.3 (studying trade secret cases decided in 
state court from 1995 to 2009 and finding that customers lists were at issue in 
52% of the cases, internal business information was at issue in 42% of the cases, 
and technical information and know-how were at issue in 27% of the cases). 
 241. This figure, however, does represent an increase from prior studies.  See 
Almeling et al., supra note 23, at 304 tbl.3 (finding that software or computer 
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cases).242  Interestingly, despite numerous popular accounts depicting 
secret formulas, such as the recipe for Coca-Cola, as the paradigm of 
a trade secret,243 few DTSA claims asserted misappropriation of such 
information (8%, 37 cases).244 
5. Relationship Between Trade Secret Owner and Alleged 
Misappropriator(s) 
Another issue is the relationship, if any, between the owner of 
the alleged trade secret and the alleged misappropriator(s).  Previous 
studies have found that the vast majority of trade secret litigation 
under state law involves “someone the trade secret owner knew—
either an employee or a business partner.”245  This remains true in 
litigation under the DTSA.  Approximately two-thirds of all DTSA 
disputes involve a current or former employee of the alleged trade 
secret owner (66%, 323 cases),246 while 26% involve a current or 
former business partner (128 cases).247  Only 10% of DTSA claims (50 
cases) involve parties who lack a prior relationship.248 
6. Misappropriation by Foreign Defendants 
As previously explained, the DTSA’s sponsors repeatedly cited 
high-profile incidents of alleged trade secret misappropriation by 
 
programs were at issue in 10% of trade secret cases in federal court in 2008); 
Almeling et al., supra note 25, at 72 tbl.3 (finding that software or computer 
programs were at issue in 6% of trade secret cases in state court from 1995 to 
2009); DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 242. See supra note 163 (explaining negative trade secrets); see also DTSA 
LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 243. See, e.g., Liam Stack, A Secret Blend of 11 Herbs and Spices Slips Out, 
but Is It the Colonel’s?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2016, at A13 (describing how the 
formula for KFC’s fried chicken, which the company describes as “one of the 
biggest trade secrets in the world,” was allegedly disclosed to a reporter); Vault 
of the Secret Formula, WORLD OF COCA-COLA, https://www.worldofcoca-cola.com 
/explore/explore-inside/explore-vault-secret-formula/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2018) 
(describing the “vault where the legendary secret formula for Coca-Cola is 
secured”); What’s Inside WD-40? Superlube’s Secret Sauce, WIRED (Apr. 20, 2009, 
12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2009/04/st-whatsinside-6/ (describing some of 
the contents of WD-40 lubricant, the recipe for which is “a closely guarded trade 
secret”). 
 244. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 245. Almeling et al., supra note 23, at 294; see also id. at 302 tbl.2 (studying 
trade secret claims in federal court in 2008 and finding that 59% involved an 
employee or former employee of the trade secret owner, while 31% involved a 
business partner); Almeling et al., supra note 25, at 69 tbl.2 (studying trade secret 
claims in state court from 1995 to 2009 and finding that 77% involved an 
employee or former employee of the trade secret owner, while 20% involved a 
business partner). 
 246. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id.  Totals exceed 100% because 15 cases involve both a current or former 
employee and a business partner of the alleged trade secret owner.  
 
W06_LEVINESEAMAN.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/18 8:43 PM 
2018] THE DTSA AT ONE 147 
foreign entities and governments as a reason that federal civil trade 
secret legislation was needed.249  However, our study finds that few 
foreigners were named as defendants in DTSA claims.  Out of 486 
cases in our dataset, only 29 (6%) alleged that a foreign citizen or 
national had committed trade secret misappropriation.250  China is 
the most represented country for foreign defendants, but only in 7 
cases—in other words, less than 2% of all DTSA claims.251  Only 1 
case named a Russian citizen as a defendant.252  Foreign citizens or 
nationals from the following countries were also named as 
defendants: Canada (5 cases), Singapore (3 cases), France (2 cases), 
India (2 cases), Taiwan (2 cases), Colombia (1 case), the Cayman 
Islands (1 case), Germany (1 case), Japan (1 case), Jordan (1 case), 
Mauritius (1 case), Sweden (1 case), and the United Kingdom (1 
case).253 
7. Cyberespionage 
In addition, the DTSA’s sponsors argued, at least initially, that 
the DTSA was needed to help combat the growing problem of 
cyberespionage.254  However, the vast majority of trade secret 
misappropriation claims under the DTSA do not allege hacking.  Only 
9% of DTSA suits (42 cases) assert that one or more defendants 
accessed the trade secret owner’s computer network without 
authorization.255  In addition, most hacking claims involve domestic 
rather than foreign defendants; only 4 cases assert that a foreign 
citizen plotted to steal trade secrets through cyberespionage.256 
 
 249. See supra notes 44–45, 50 and accompanying text. 
 250. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93.  In our dataset, 451 cases (93%) involve 
only U.S. defendants.  In an additional 5 cases (1%), the citizenship of one or more 
defendants is unclear from the pleadings.  Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Complaint at 1, OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Sultanov, No. 5:17-
cv-00017-NC (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 4, 2017) (naming a dual citizen of the United 
States and the Russian Federation as a defendant). 
 253. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93.  One case involves two related foreign 
defendants.  See Amended Complaint at 2, Poly-Med, Inc. v. Novus Sci. Pte. Ltd., 
No. 8:15-cv-01964-JMC, (D.S.C. filed Nov. 29, 2016) (naming a Singaporean 
corporation and a Swedish corporation that are part of the same firm—Novus 
Scientific—as defendants). 
 254. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, 
at 3 (2016) (discussing “the increased digitization of critical data” that is “highly 
susceptible to theft”); S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2 (2016) (“Protecting trade secrets 
has become increasingly difficult given ever-evolving technological 
advancements.  Thieves are using increasingly sophisticated methods to steal 
trade secrets and the growing use of technology and cyberspace has made trade 
secret theft detection particularly difficult.”).  
 255. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (defining hacking); see also 
DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 256. See generally Complaint, KCG Ams. LLC v. Zhang, No. 5:17-cv-01953-
EJD (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 7, 2017) (alleging that the defendant, a Chinese 
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8. Nondisclosure Agreements 
Finally, we looked at one important measure frequently used by 
companies to protect their trade secret information against accidental 
or intentional disclosure—a nondisclosure agreement.257  72% of all 
DTSA claims (350 out of 486 cases) assert that one or more alleged 
misappropriators were subject to an NDA.258  In particular, 81% of 
current and former employees (262 out of 323 cases) who allegedly 
misappropriated a trade secret had agreed to an NDA, according to 
these pleadings—a difference that is statistically significant when 
compared to nonemployee defendants.259 
C. Interim Relief 
This section summarizes the data on interim relief in DTSA 
cases, including motions and court decisions on TROs and 
preliminary injunctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65,260 
as well as ex parte seizures under the DTSA.261 
 
national, obtained other employees’ user names and passwords and logged into 
their desktops without authorization to copy the alleged trade secret 
information); Complaint, River City Media, LLC. v. Kromtech All. Corp., No. 
2:17-cv-00105-SAB (E.D. Wash. filed Mar. 21, 2017) (asserting that the 
defendants, including a German corporation, “perpetrated a coordinated, 
months-long cyberattack” against the plaintiffs); Complaint, Vape Soc’y Supply 
Corp. v. Zeiadeh, No. 8:16-cv-01971-JCG (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 29, 2016) (asserting 
that a Jordanian national accessed one of the plaintiff’s computers without 
authorization in violation of the CFAA, changed passwords, altered access 
controls for the plaintiff’s website, and destroyed data); Complaint, Effex Capital, 
LLC v. Wilson, No. 1:16-cv-05438-ALC (S.D.N.Y. filed July 7, 2016) (alleging that 
the defendant, a U.K. citizen, violated the CFAA and a state computer crimes 
statute by accessing trade secret information without authorization or by 
exceeding authorized access on his final day of employment); DTSA LITIGATION, 
supra note 93. 
 257. See Almeling et al., supra note 25, at 81 (“Confidentiality agreements 
with employees are the reasonable measure that courts cite most often in both 
federal and state [trade secret] cases.”); Evans, supra note 12, at 198 (“In federal 
case law interpreting state UTSAs, the obligation of confidentiality appears to be 
the most important consideration for determining whether the trade secret owner 
used reasonable efforts to protect its trade secret . . . .”); Mareesa A. Frederick & 
Clara N. Jiménez, Are the Crown Jewels Really Safe? Considerations for Building 
a Strong Trade Secret Portfolio in Today’s Market, LANDSLIDE, Mar./Apr. 2017, at 
14, 17 (2017) (“Because employees create and work with trade secret information 
on a daily basis, they play a pivotal role in ensuring this information stays 
protected.  As such, companies should require employees to sign confidentiality 
or nondisclosure agreements as part of their employment agreement.”). 
 258. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 259. p < 0.001. DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 260. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a) (governing preliminary injunctions); id. R. 65(b) 
(governing TROs). 
 261. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2) (West 2018) (authorizing ex parte seizures). 
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1. Temporary Restraining Orders 
A temporary restraining order may be granted by a court when a 
plaintiff is “faced with the possibility that irreparable injury will 
occur before a hearing for a preliminary injunction . . . can be held.”262  
TROs thus are intended to “preserv[e] the status quo . . . just so long 
as is necessary to hold a hearing.”263  A TRO may be granted on an ex 
parte basis without notice to the other party only if the moving party 
can demonstrate “immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage” 
and the party’s attorney certifies why notice should not be required.264  
By rule, a TRO may not exceed fourteen days unless the court has 
good cause to extend it or the adverse party consents.265  While 
uncommon, “courts appear to grant TROs . . . in trade secret 
litigation more frequently than in any other area of intellectual 
property law,” in part because the public disclosure of trade secret 
information destroys its value.266 
For the 486 cases in our dataset, 34% (164 cases) involve a motion 
seeking a TRO.  TROs were granted in 72 of these cases and were 
denied in 52 cases.  There was no decision in the remaining 40 cases.  
In short, TROs were granted 58% of the time (72 of 124 cases) the 
court reached a decision. 
2. Preliminary Injunctions 
A preliminary injunction is a form of equitable relief “that is 
issued to protect [a] plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve 
the court’s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the 
merits.”267  A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that 
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 
entitled to such relief.”268  To obtain a preliminary injunction, the 
plaintiff must prove that it “is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] 
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 
relief, that the balance of equities tips in [the plaintiff’s] favor, and 
that an injunction is in the public interest.”269  In trade secret cases, 
the threat of a trade secret’s disclosure may establish the necessary 
irreparable harm.270 
 
 262. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 11A FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 2951 (3d ed. 2017). 
 263. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck 
Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 440 (1974). 
 264. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1). 
 265. Id. R. 65(b)(2). 
 266. TERRENCE P. ROSS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND 
REMEDIES § 11.06, at 68 (2004). 
 267. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 262, § 2947. 
 268. Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 
 269. Id. at 20. 
 270. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 
1992); see also JAGER, supra note 34, § 7:5 (“In the typical trade secret case, the 
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For the 486 cases in our dataset, 45% (220 cases) involve a motion 
seeking a preliminary injunction.  A preliminary injunction was 
granted in 86 cases and was denied in 62 cases.  There was no decision 
in the remaining 72 cases.  In short, preliminary injunctions were 
granted 58% of the time (86 of 148 cases) when the court reached a 
decision.  This grant rate is substantially higher than that reported 
in the Almeling et al. study of pre-DTSA trade secret litigation in 
federal court, which found that trade secrets owners received a 
preliminary injunction or TRO less than 40% of the time.271 
3. Ex Parte Seizures 
As previously explained, the DTSA added a new remedy not 
previously available in trade secret litigation: a court order for the 
seizure of property containing trade secret information granted on an 
ex parte basis.  During the legislative process, Congress added 
numerous requirements for obtaining this relief, including showing 
that “immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such seizure is 
not ordered,”272 demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits of 
the trade secret claim,273 and establishing that a TRO or preliminary 
injunction “would be inadequate to achieve” effective relief “because 
the party to which the order would be issued would evade, avoid, or 
otherwise not comply with the order.”274 
Despite (or perhaps, because of) receiving extensive attention 
during the DTSA’s enactment, the statutory ex parte seizure remedy 
has been a little-used provision by trade secret plaintiffs.  Out of 486 
cases in the dataset, only 2% (10 cases) involve a motion for an ex 
parte seizure.  In only two cases was an ex parte seizure granted.275  
Courts denied a seizure in seven other cases, and there was no 
decision in the remaining case. 
 
irreparable harm alleged by the trade secret owner is the threatened disclosure 
of trade secrets by ex-employees to a new employer.”). 
 271. See Almeling et al., supra note 23, at 314 tbls.11 & 12 (finding that TROs 
and PIs were granted in 44 cases but were denied in 67 cases; data aggregated 
between tables).  This difference is statistically significant at p < .01. 
 272. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(a), 130 Stat. 
376, 376 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (West 2018)).  The authors 
were among the drafters of letters to Congress that sought to draw attention to 
the risk of abuse attendant to the originally drafted ex parte seizure provisions.  
See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 273. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 
 274. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 275. Seizure Order, Mission Capital Advisors LLC v. Romaka, No. 1:16-CV-
05878-LLS (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016); Order, AVX Corp. v. Kim, 6:17-CV-00624-
MGL (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2017).  The authors are aware of one additional case where 
an ex parte seizure has been granted under the DTSA; however, the complaint 
was filed outside the time of study, so it is not included in our dataset.  See Order, 
Blue Star Land Servs. LLC v. Coleman, No. 5:17-CV-00931-R (W.D. Okla. Aug. 
31, 2017). 
 
W06_LEVINESEAMAN.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/18 8:43 PM 
2018] THE DTSA AT ONE 151 
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
Because this study represents only the first year of litigation 
under the DTSA, all possible implications may not be evident.  
Nonetheless, the results from our study have several potentially 
important implications for trade secret and IP law, as well as 
innovation policy more generally. 
First, claims under the DTSA appear in many cases to overlap 
with state trade secrets law as well as with other federal and state 
law causes of action that encompass some or all of the same alleged 
misconduct.276  This lends empirical support to the claims of some IP 
scholars that trade secret law is merely a collection of norms protected 
by other legal doctrines, such as contract, fraud, and agency law,277 a 
proposition which remains hotly debated.278  Moreover, it suggests 
that the DTSA is operating in a manner consistent with its sponsors’ 
stated goal of allowing greater access to federal courts for trade secret 
plaintiffs.279 
In addition, overlapping state and federal trade secret claims 
have the potential to create issues of inconsistency and lack of 
uniformity in areas where the DTSA and UTSA diverge.280  As one 
commentator framed the issue, “now that we have a federal statute, 
what law are federal district courts going to use in order to interpret 
the text and flesh out the doctrines of the DTSA?”281  While it is 
 
 276. See supra Subpart IV.B.2–3. 
 277. See Bone, supra note 29, at 245 (arguing that trade secrecy law should 
be governed by contract principles); see also Lemley, supra note 29, at 312 
(“Courts, lawyers, scholars, and treatise writers argue over whether trade secrets 
are a creature of contract, of tort, of property, or even of criminal law.”); Risch, 
supra note 29, at 3 (noting that trade secrets are “the most important and most 
litigated form of intellectual property,” yet many scholars maintain that “there is 
no law of trade secrets”). 
 278. See Lemley, supra note 29, at 353 (arguing that “[t]rade secrets are IP 
rights” and that this understanding provides “a way to think about how those 
rights are designed, a way that has significant implications for how trade secret 
law . . . interacts with other laws”); Levine, supra note 20, at 147 (noting the 
pervasiveness of trade secret law, as commentators and courts historically have 
considered the application of trade secret law amongst various disciplines, 
“whether [it is] considered a function of property, tort, unfair trade competition, 
or contract”). 
 279. See supra Subpart IV.B.1. 
 280. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9, at 833 (“While many assume that 
the principles governing trade secrecy articulated in the UTSA . . . will continue 
to apply to the DTSA, this is not a foregone conclusion for the simple reason that 
federal courts are not bound to interpret the DTSA in accordance with the 
UTSA.”); Professors’ 2015 Letter, supra note 59, at 7 (“The DTSA would 
undermine th[e] high degree of uniformity [pervading trade secret law] by 
creating new differences with existing state law and by requiring the 
development of a new body of federal jurisprudence.”). 
 281. Camilla Alexandra Hrdy, Sandeen and Seaman: Toward a Federal 
Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 6, 2016), 
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reasonable to expect courts to look to existing state trade secret law 
for guidance, the unique aspects of the DTSA, from the ex parte 
seizure provision282 to the ambiguous status of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine,283 suggest that trade secret law may be in for a 
bumpy ride. 
More broadly, our findings suggest that further research into the 
relationship between trade secret law and other forms of IP 
protection, such as federal patent, copyright, and trademark law, is 
warranted, as a notable number of cases in the dataset involve 
multiple types of IP rights.284  As discussed earlier, there is limited 
empirical and scholarly writing on trade secrecy.285  Comparative 
literature on trade secrecy across national boundaries is even 
sparser.286  The DTSA, rendering trade secret law on par with other 
federal IP laws, should now be easier to study comparatively. 
As for venue, many DTSA cases are filed in major metropolitan 
areas with clusters of highly innovative industries.287  In contrast to 
patent litigation—which is heavily concentrated in two smaller, more 
rural districts (the Eastern District of Texas and the District of 
Delaware)288—litigation under the DTSA is more broadly distributed.  
This result suggests that trade secrecy remains of particular interest 
 
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2016/09/sandeen-and-seaman-toward 
-federal.html (discussing Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9). 
 282. See supra notes 60, 68 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 61, 84 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra Subpart IV.B.2.  As explained by Levine and Sichelman, to the 
extent that one seeks theoretical analysis of the relationship between trade 
secrets and other formal appropriation mechanisms, there exists almost no 
comparison of trade secrecy to methods other than patents, like copyright.  See 
generally Levine & Sichelman, supra note 7. 
 285. See supra Subpart II.C. 
 286. For one recent paper comparing trade secrecy protection between 
countries, see Douglas C. Lippoldt & Mark F. Schultz, Uncovering Trade Secrets 
– An Empirical Assessment of Economic Implications for Protection for 





 287. See supra Subpart IV.A.2.  See generally COMPTIA, CYBERSTATES 2016 
(2016), https://www.comptia.org/docs/default-source/advocacydocs/cyberstates 
/comptia-cyberstates-2016-vfinal-v2.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (offering a state-by-state 
summary of employment in information technology). 
 288. See supra note 204 and accompanying text; see also Matthew Sag, IP 
Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994–2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1065, 1088 (2016) 
(noting the “astonishing rise” of patent cases in the Eastern District of Texas and 
the District of Delaware).  See generally Brian Love & James Yoon, Predictably 
Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 
20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (comparing U.S. patent litigation across districts 
to consider the Eastern District of Texas’s popularity with patent plaintiffs). 
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to innovative industries, which comports with prior research,289 and 
we expect that interest to grow as the DTSA becomes more 
established and understood. 
Regarding the claims themselves, the large number of DTSA 
cases against former employees—many of whom are also subject to 
noncompete agreements290—raises the question of whether trade 
secret misappropriation claims may hinder the mobility of highly 
skilled employees and thus potentially affect entrepreneurship and 
innovation more generally.291  To the extent that the DTSA amplifies 
mobility of labor issues, particularly in claims that are later found to 
lack merit, the DTSA could have a negative effect on information 
diffusion.  This is an issue that warrants further examination in 
future studies. 
Importantly, the fact that few DTSA cases involve claims of 
computer hacking suggests that the law is not as valuable of a weapon 
against cyberespionage as the law’s sponsors had at one time 
hoped.292  While it is, again, too early to conclude that the DTSA is 
ineffective against cyberespionage, this result does comport with the 
sponsors’ shift during the legislative process toward pointing to other 
 
 289. See Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, supra note 89 (finding a 
positive relationship between seeking short-term value, the use of lead-time, and 
secrecy); Zaby, supra note 86, at 159 (emphasizing that if “the winner of a R&D 
race decides to patent his invention, he loses his technological lead and 
consequently all firms face the same probability of success subsequently”). 
 290. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (describing coding for 
noncompete agreements).  We found that nearly half (47%, 153 of 323 cases) of 
DTSA claims involving current or former employees also alleged that the 
employee was or is subject to a noncompete agreement. 
 291. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY: TRENDS, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES 5–6, 8–9, 14–15 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20161025 
_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf (discussing the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of noncompete agreements); see also Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive 
Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. 
REV. 789, 791 (2015) (“Noncompete agreements are now required in almost every 
industry and position, stymieing job mobility and information flows.”).  But see 
Jonathan Barnett & Ted M. Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation 
Markets 7 (USC Ctr. for Law & Social Sci., Research Paper No. 16-13, 2016) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758854 (suggesting that “enforcing noncompetes 
limits the mobility of R&D personnel, which may hinder the efficient allocation 
of talent across firms” but finding that “the conventional analysis of noncompetes 
and other restraints on employee mobility cannot support a definitive position 
against or in favor of enforcing these agreements”).  See generally Matt Marx & 
Lee Fleming, Non-Compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry . . . and Exit?, 12 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 39 (2012) (suggesting that noncompete agreements 
can affect the level and sources of entrepreneurial activity). 
 292. See supra Subpart IV.B.7; see also Levine, supra note 12, at 329 
(asserting that the DTSA “solves a problem that has not been proven to exist, 
while creating new or exacerbating existing problems and failing to address 
cyberespionage directly”). 
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rationales for adopting the DTSA.293  To the extent that there are 
early lessons regarding cyberespionage from this study, it lends 
support to the argument that a more fruitful statutory course of 
combatting such activity may lie in reforming the CFAA,294 which has 
been the subject of wide criticism.295  Especially since it is not being 
used heavily to combat cyberespionage, the DTSA may serve as a 
distraction from considering real solutions to the serious 
cyberespionage problem facing American industry. 
Furthermore, the widespread availability of interim relief for 
trade secret owners under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65—nearly 
a quarter of all trade secret plaintiffs were awarded a TRO, a 
preliminary injunction, or both296—has rendered the DTSA’s ex parte 
seizure provision largely superfluous.  Some commentators have 
asserted that the relative lack of ex parte seizures so far demonstrates 
that concerns raised by law professors and others about this provision 
were overblown.297  But these claims overlook the fact that numerous 
safeguards were added during the legislative process to protect 
against abusive ex parte seizures, including clarifying that they could 
only be awarded in “extraordinary circumstances,” suggesting the 
 
 293. See Levine, supra note 55 (stating that the rationale of the DTSA shifted 
from cyberespionage to “the rise of trade secret theft by rogue employees and the 
need for uniformity in trade secret law”). 
 294. See Levine, supra note 12, at 329; Levine & Sandeen, supra note 12, at 
259–60.  
 295. See Jamie Williams, Our Fight to Rein in the CFAA: 2016 in Review, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/12 
/our-fight-rein-cfaa-2016-review (“The law’s notoriously vague language has 
confused courts, chilled security research, and given overzealous prosecutors 
broad discretion to bring criminal charges for behavior that in no way qualifies 
as breaking into a computer.  And it’s out of touch with how we use computers 
today.”); Josephine Wolff, The Hacking Law That Can’t Hack It, SLATE (Sept. 27, 
2017, 11:15 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/09 
/the_computer_fraud_and_abuse_act_turns_30_years_old.html (criticizing the 
CFAA). 
 296. See supra Subparts IV.C.1–2 (finding that preliminary relief was granted 
in 121 out of 486 cases).  Courts granted both a TRO and a preliminary injunction 
in 37 cases.  See DTSA LITIGATION, supra note 93. 
 297. See, e.g., Jessica Engler, Insights and Lessons: The Defend Trade Secrets 
Act at Year One, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., Fall 2017, at 20, 21 (“[F]ears that the ex parte 
seizure provision would be misused seem to be mostly assuaged.”); Paul M. 
Mersino, The DTSA’s Ex Parte Seizure Order: The “Ex” Stands for 
“Extraordinary,” TECH. & MARKET. L. BLOG (Feb. 2, 2017), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/02/the-dtsas-ex-parte-seizure-order 
-the-ex-stands-for-extraordinary-guest-blog-post.htm (“Based on a review of all 
known cases, . . . [i]t appears that ex parte seizures have not been abused, as 
some feared.”); see also Pooley, supra note 12, at 1056 (asserting that law 
professors’ concerns about the ex parte seizure provisions were “ungrounded and 
exaggerated”). 
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possibility that Congress took these concerns about potential abuse 
seriously.298  
Finally, as federal courts work through these cases for the first 
time, their collective interpretation of the scope of trade secret law 
will undoubtedly impact how states interpret their own trade secret 
laws.  Given relatively “fresh” eyes on the law, we envision conflicts 
that may lead to altered contours of trade secret law, cybersecurity 
practice, and information law more broadly.  We also expect to see 
increasingly nuanced opinions out of federal courts, which should aid 
in our overall understanding of trade secret law and information 
sharing today. 
For example, deepening the understanding of trade secret law at 
the federal level might allow courts, over time, to take a more 
granular view of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) trade 
secret exemption.299  The FOIA trade secret exemption has been 
liberally applied by courts and is generally found to exempt wide 
swaths of information from public disclosure, even after litigation 
challenges.300  There has been a judicial and legislative thumb on the 
scale in favor of protecting trade secrets from public disclosure, even 
in situations where the public might have a strong interest in the 
information, like code in voting machines301 and the chemical formula 
of liquids used in hydraulic fracturing.302  It is conceivable that 
 
 298. Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 9, at 851 & n.126 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (West 2018)). 
 299. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012) (exempting from FOIA “matters that 
are . . . trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a 
person and privileged or confidential”). 
 300. See Levine, supra note 20, at 137–38 (noting the tension between the 
interests of the public and commerce—“[s]ecrecy, and its attendant goals of 
pecuniary gain and commercial competition, conflict with the methods and 
purpose of transparent and accountable democratic governance”); see also David 
S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 
64 (2011) (arguing that the government should not have the power to define 
information about public expenditures as a trade secret). 
 301. See Levine, supra note 20, at 138 (arguing that the conflict between 
secrecy and transparency and accountability “is crystallized in the private 
distribution of voting machines”). 
 302. See David S. Levine & Mary L. Lyndon, Law Professors’ Second Alaska 
Oil and Conservation Commission Trade Secrets Letter (Oct. 14, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2363099; Vanessa 
Schipani, The Facts on Fracking Chemical Disclosure, FACTCHECK.ORG (Apr. 7, 
2017), http://www.factcheck.org/2017/04/facts-fracking-chemical-disclosure/ 
(noting that a federal judge struck down a fracking rule promulgated by the 
Bureau of Land Management in 2015 that was intended to protect groundwater 
and would have required companies to “report some of the chemicals they used 
during fracking operations on federal and tribal lands in all 50 states”).  See 
generally David S. Levine, Confidentiality Creep and Opportunistic Privacy, 20 
TULANE J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 11 (2017) (discussing, in the context of the 
alleged Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election via social 
media, the arguable need for public access to the algorithmic code (i.e., software) 
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greater federal court exposure to trade secret law may allow courts to 
more thoroughly examine blanket trade secret exemption arguments 
and whether the information at issue actually qualifies as a trade 
secret.303  On the other hand, it is also possible the DTSA’s legislative 
history evincing a strong public policy in favor of trade secret 
protection304 will make courts less likely to overturn an 
administrative entity’s decision to exempt such information from 
disclosure.  To that end, it would be helpful for future scholars to track 
citations in FOIA judicial and administrative decisions to DTSA cases 
and their impact, if any, on outcomes. 
In sum, this Article’s focus on an empirical assessment of DTSA 
litigation is only the beginning of DTSA-related studies.  For example, 
beyond the scope of this Article are the internal discussions and 
decisions that lead trade secret owners to decide whether to file 
litigation under the DTSA or not.  Other variables that might be 
studied include (1) the type of plaintiff (e.g., large/publicly traded 
firm, small business, or individual), (2) the sector or industry where 
the trade secret is used, (3) the frequency of whistleblower defense 
claims, and (4) the outcomes of DTSA cases.  Nonetheless, by 
understanding how the DTSA is being utilized in court in its first 
year, we can collectively begin the process of critically evaluating the 
impact of this major addition to IP law. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The DTSA represents one of the most significant changes to the 
landscape of IP law in decades.  Through an original dataset that 
examines cases filed in the law’s first year, this Article provides 
numerous findings regarding the DTSA’s early impact on trade secret 
law and litigation.  It also suggests some implications from this data, 
including the potential need for additional legislation more directly 
aimed at cyberespionage, the possibility of a lack of uniformity due to 
overlapping federal and state law claims covering trade secret 
misappropriation, and the potential negative impact of the law on 
labor mobility and information diffusion.  In short, while it will not be 
the final word on the DTSA, this Article provides a preliminary 
assessment of the law’s potential strengths, drawbacks, and 
limitations, upon which to build. 
 
used by Facebook in order to understand how much information was actually 
shared and how to prevent such interference in the future). 
 303. See Levine, supra note 300, at 101–02 (explaining that courts rarely, if 
ever, question a trade secret designation in the face of a FOIA exemption 
challenge). 
 304. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 1–3 (2016) (noting the detrimental 
impact trade secret theft has on Americans’ quality of life and how the DTSA will 
“incentivize future innovation while protecting and encouraging the creation of 
American jobs”). 
